Innovative moments in psychotherapy: dialogical processes in developing narratives by Gonçalves, Miguel M. et al.
  
 
 
 
 
 
DIALOGICALITY IN FOCUS:  
CHALLENGES TO THEORY,  
METHOD AND APPLICATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MARIANN MÄRTSIN, BRADY WAGONER,  
EMMA-LOUISE AVELING, IRINI KADIANAKI,  
LISA WHITTAKER 
 EDITORS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 
New York 
 
Copyright © 2011 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 
 
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical 
photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. 
 
For permission to use material from this book please contact us: 
Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 
Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com 
 
NOTICE TO THE READER 
The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or 
implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No 
liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of 
information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, 
consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers’ use of, or 
reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated 
and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. 
 
Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in 
this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage 
to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise 
contained in this publication. 
 
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the 
subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not 
engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert 
assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A 
DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE 
AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. 
 
Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book. 
 
LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 978-1-61122-817-5 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York
In: Dialogicality in Focus ISBN 978-1-61122-817-5 
Editors: M. Märtsin, B. Wagoner et al. pp.  © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 8 
 
 
 
INNOVATIVE MOMENTS IN PSYCHOTHERAPY: 
DIALOGICAL PROCESSES IN DEVELOPING 
NARRATIVES 
 
 
Miguel M. Gonçalves, Carla Cunha, António P. Ribeiro,  
Inês Mendes, Anita Santos, Marlene Matos and João Salgado 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter presents an overview of the research programme that is being developed in 
our research centre addressing narrative change processes in psychotherapy. Our departing 
point was the narrative metaphor of psychotherapy (Angus & McLeod, 2004; Bruner, 2004; 
Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995; White & Epston, 1990) and the emphasis on the narrative 
construction and re-construction of the self (Bruner, 1986, McAdams, 1993, Sarbin, 1986), 
which assumes that clients transform themselves through the stories they tell – to themselves 
and to others. We also proceed from the idea that self-narratives entail particular dialogical 
processes that can become visible or be enhanced in the psychotherapeutic setting. 
Furthermore, by adopting this dialogical and narrative standpoint, therapists and clients can 
use this inner multiplicity as an opportunity for identity changes. 
While this general metaphor of ‘clients as storytellers’ has framed our work in 
psychotherapy research, the re-authoring model of White and Epston’s (1990; see also White, 
2007) and the dialogical perspective of Hermans and collaborators (Hermans, 1996; Hermans 
& Hermans-Jansen, 1995; Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2004) have 
been shaping our conceptual lenses in the study of change in therapy.  
In this chapter we elaborate upon a central concept of our research: the concept of 
innovative moments (IMs, also named as i-moments in previous publications), drawn from 
White and Epston’s (1990) notion of ‘unique outcome’ and discuss the dialogical dynamics 
that are involved in IMs emergence and development in therapy.  
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CHANGE AS NARRATIVE RE-CONSTRUCTION OF THE SELF 
 
Over the last decades, several authors within the narrative and dialogical fields have been 
acknowledging the centrality of ‘telling stories’ in human lives (e.g., Bruner, 1986; 
McAdams, 1993). Self-narratives are the result of the human effort to create meaning from 
our experience in the world and to have our perspectives validated by others, to whom we are 
dialogically intertwined (Gonçalves, Matos & Santos, 2009). The construction of meaning 
through self-narratives involves a process of interpretation, selection and synthesis of life 
experiences (McAdams, 1993). Complex elements of episodic memory, personal and social 
expectations, emotional and interpersonal experiences are selected and integrated into a 
personal account in the form of a story. The story is performed to others in the specific act of 
telling it, simultaneously projecting a certain present view into the future. The segments of the 
experience that are integrated in our self-narrative frames are shaped by our prior salient and 
more familiar experiences, both with social others and with ourselves. Additionally, the 
stories we tell are also constrained by the interlocutor and the context (for example, our self-
narratives vary according to the social role we are assigned in a given context).  
Therefore, given the multivocal nature of these sources of narrative production (see 
Hermans, 1996), self-narratives involve processes of dialogical negotiation, disagreement and 
conciliation between self and other (this ‘other’ can be specific social others, broader cultural 
messages and prescriptions, or even other parts of oneself).  
Hence, the process of narrating a story pictures the self, as narrator, in dimensions that go 
beyond the narrated content. Self-narratives present the possibility of simultaneously 
revealing our authorship – by the way we view ourselves – and disclosing our position in the 
world – by the way we present ourselves to others (Wortham, 2001). As Hermans (1996) 
claims, this means that the self is simultaneously embedded in the content of the story and the 
act of telling it to another person. According to some authors (Hermans, 1996; see also 
Sarbin, 1986), this dual feature of agency and positioning of the self – both as an 
author/narrator and a social actor – is critically embedded in the unfolding narrative process, 
and it is through this process that self can be transformed. 
According to the re-authoring model of White and Epston (1990), clients frequently seek 
therapeutic help when the self has lost its ability to flexibly interpret the world, becoming 
trapped within redundant forms of meaning-making that are no longer capable of 
incorporating the diversity and multiplicity of lived experience. Clients become entrapped in 
‘problem-saturated stories’ (White, 2007; White & Epston, 1990) – that is, narratives that 
dominate and minimize the possibilities of creative and flexible meaning, and thus become 
problematic.  
These all-encompassing stories usually favour one perspective over multiple others 
(being more monological than dialogical; Hermans & Hermans-Jansen, 1995), and tend to be 
fixed around a single dominant problematic theme (see Neimeyer, Herrero & Botella, 2006; 
Santos & Gonçalves, 2009). As a consequence they constrict personal adaptability and 
undermine other possibilities for thinking and acting (Gonçalves et al., 2009). For example, a 
client seeking therapy in order to deal with daily anxiety and panic attacks, may narrate 
several stories in the session that illustrate how he or she is too afraid to engage independently 
in everyday life activities, always needing to be taken care of by other members of the family. 
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In this case, fear is the theme of the problematic self-narrative and avoidance behaviours 
appear as compliance with the problem’s rule. 
Congruently, therapy can be an opportunity for gaining awareness of the constraining 
power of these problematic self-narratives and developing alternative, more flexible ones. 
Following White and Epston (1990): 
 
“when persons experience problems for which they seek therapy, (a) the narratives in which 
they are storying their experience and/or in which they are having their experience storied by 
others do not sufficiently represent their lived experience, and (b), in these circumstances, 
there will be significant and vital aspects of their lived experience that contradict these 
dominant narratives.” (p. 40) 
 
Thus, with the acknowledgement that there are always details of lived experience not 
assimilated by the problematic self-narrative, the therapist’s action in re-authoring therapy 
should lead to the search for these opposing aspects or ‘unique outcomes’ in the client’s life. 
According to White and Epston (1990), the concept of unique outcome refers to all details 
outside the problematic self-narrative that appear as exceptions to the problem’s prescriptions 
and an attentive therapist would be listening to them within the stories brought by their 
clients. In the above example, our client that is currently consumed with panic attacks can 
remember a situation in the past when he or she was able to leave home alone and did not 
experience any panic attack as predicted (i.e., a unique outcome towards fear). White and 
Epston (1990) have argued that: 
 
“As unique outcomes are identified, persons can be encouraged to engage in performances of 
new meaning in relation to these. Success with this requires that the unique outcome be 
plotted into an alternative story about the person’s life.” (p. 41) 
 
Along these lines, by bringing the client’s awareness to these exceptional moments 
opposing the power of the problem, therapy can introduce novelty in meaning-making and, 
thus, create opportunities for the emergence of new self-narratives (White, 2007). Social 
validation (by the self, the therapist, meaningful social others) is essential in the development 
of the new self-narratives since narratives are always performative acts and, as such, produce 
relational results and new lived realities to which, in turn, we must reinterpret and adapt to. 
When we began our research project, we directly took the notion of ‘unique outcome’ to 
analyse data but our terminology evolved along with our findings (Gonçalves et al., 2009). 
We now prefer the notion of IMs for two main reasons: first of all, ‘unique’ might convey the 
misleading idea – for readers unfamiliar with the re-authoring model – of rare experiences 
appearing outside the problematic rule; however, these exceptions occur quite frequently in 
therapy, even in unsuccessful cases. Secondly, the term ‘outcomes’ stresses results or outputs 
and, as we shall argue, these innovations reflect a developmental process building up towards 
a given outcome at the termination of therapy (that traditionally is classified into good or poor 
outcome). It is because we are more interested in the developing nature of narrative 
transformations in therapy that we favour the notion of IMs over unique outcomes. 
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INNOVATIVE MOMENTS AS OPPORTUNITIES  
FOR THERAPEUTIC CHANGE 
 
In our initial studies of re-authoring therapy with a sample of women who were victims 
of domestic violence (Matos, Santos, Gonçalves & Martins, 2009), we inductively identified 
five categories of IMs: ‘action’, ‘reflection’, ‘protest’, ‘re-conceptualisation’ and ‘performing 
change’ IMs (Gonçalves et al., 2009). We will now present these categories, illustrating them 
with clinical vignettes. In each example, an IM is identified according to the problematic self-
narrative specific to the case
1
. 
Action IMs are events when the person acted in a way that is contrary to the problematic 
self-narrative. 
 
Clinical vignette 1 (problematic narrative: agoraphobia) 
Therapist: Was it difficult for you to take this step (not accepting the rules of “fear” and going 
out)? 
Client: Yes, it was a huge step. For the last several months I barely went out. Even coming to 
therapy was a major challenge. I felt really powerless going out. I have to prepare myself 
really well to be able to do this. 
 
Reflection IMs refer to new understandings or thoughts that undermine the dominance of 
the problematic self-narrative, sometimes involving a cognitive challenge to the problem or 
cultural norms and practices that sustain it. In this sense, reflection IMs frequently assume the 
form of new perspectives or insights of the self, somehow contradicting the problematic self-
narrative. 
 
Clinical vignette 2 (problematic self-narrative: depression) 
Client: I’m starting to wonder about what my life will be like if I keep feeding my depression. 
Therapist: It’s becoming clear that depression has a hidden agenda for your life? 
Client: Yes, sure.  
Therapist: What is it that depression wants from you? 
Client: It wants to rule my whole life and in the end it wants to steal my life from me. 
 
Protest IMs involve moments of critique, confrontation or antagonism towards the 
problem (directed at others or at oneself), its specifications and implications or people that 
support it. Opposition of this sort can either take the form of actions (achieved or planned), 
thoughts or emotions, but it necessarily implies an active form of resistance, repositioning the 
client in a more proactive confrontation to the problem (which does not happen in the 
previous action and reflection IMs). Thus, in this type of IMs we can always distinguish two 
positions in the self (implicit or explicit): one that supports the problematic self-narrative and 
other that challenges it; in these moments the second position acquires more power than the 
first.  
 
Clinical vignette 3 (Problematic self-narrative: feeling rejected and judged by her parents) 
Client: I talked about it just to demonstrate what I’ve been doing until now, fighting for it.  
                                                        
1
 These clinical vignettes were based on Gonçalves et al. (2009). 
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Therapist: Fighting against the idea that you should do what your parents thought was good 
for you? 
Client: I was trying to change myself all the time, to please them. But now I’m getting tired, I 
am realising that it doesn’t make any sense to make this effort. 
Therapist: That effort keeps you in a position of changing yourself all the time, the way you 
feel and think. 
Client: Yes, sure. And I’m really tired of that, I can’t stand it anymore. After all, parents are 
supposed to love their children and not judge them all the time. 
 
Re-conceptualisation IMs are closer to stories due to their time sequencing nature. In 
these types of narratives there is a personal recognition of a contrast between the past and the 
present in terms of change, and also the personal ability to describe the processes that lead to 
that transformation. It is because the person is capable of describing the processes underneath 
the achieved changes – through a meta-reflective level – that these IMs go further than action, 
reflection and protest. Not only is the client capable of noticing something new, but he or she 
is also capable of recognizing him or herself as different when compared with a past 
condition, due to a transformation process that happened in between. Thus, they always 
involve two dimensions: a) a description of the shift between two positions (past and present) 
and b) the transformation process that underlies this shift.  
 
Clinical vignette 4 (Problematic self-narrative: domestic violence and its effects) 
Client: I think I started enjoying myself again. I had a time…
2
 I think I’ve stopped in time. 
I’ve always been a person that liked myself. There was a time… maybe because of my 
attitude, because of all that was happening, I think there was a time that I was not 
respecting myself… despite the effort to show that I wasn’t feeling… so well with 
myself… I couldn’t feel that joy of living that I recovered now… and now I keep 
thinking “you have to move on and get your life back”.  
Therapist: This position of “you have to move on” has been decisive?  
Client: That was important. I felt so weak in the beginning! I hated feeling like that…. Today 
I think “I’m not weak”. In fact, maybe I am very strong, because of all that happened to 
me, I can still see the good side of people and I don’t think I’m being naïve… Now, when 
I look at myself, I think “no, you can really make a difference, and you have value as a 
person”. For a while I couldn’t have this dialogue with myself, I couldn’t say “you can do 
it” nor even think “I am good at this or that”. 
 
The final category is performing change IMs. They refer to new aims, projects, activities 
or experiences – anticipated or acted – that become possible because of the acquired changes. 
Clients may apply new abilities and resources to daily life or retrieve old plans or intentions 
postponed due to the dominance of the problem. 
 
Clinical vignette 5 (Problematic self-narrative: domestic violence and its effects) 
Therapist: You seem to have so many projects for the future now! 
Client: Yes, you’re right. I want to do all the things that were impossible for me to do while I 
was dominated by fear. I want to work again and to have the time to enjoy my life with 
my children. I want to have friends again. The loss of all the friendships of the past is 
something that still hurts me really deeply. I want to have friends again, to have people to 
talk to, to share experiences and to feel the complicity of others in my life again. 
                                                        
2
 “…” - stands for a pause in the conversation. 
Miguel M. Gonçalves, Carla Cunha, António P. Ribeiro et al. 8 
According to Bruner (1986), narratives always imply two landscapes: on the one hand, 
there is the ‘landscape of action’ that refers to who the actors are, what actions are taking 
place, and what setting or scenario is framing the development of the plot. On the other hand, 
there is the ‘landscape of consciousness’ that refers to what the actors know, feel, think, value 
or plan. If we take Bruner’s two dimensions, we could clearly say that action IMs belong to 
the ‘landscape of action’ while reflection IMs belong to the ‘landscape of consciousness’, 
each being “pure” representatives of that particular dimension. Protest IMs, in turn, can occur 
in one landscape or the other, or even have elements from both; likewise, performing change 
can be situated at both landscapes, since they can refer to new feelings or thoughts 
(‘consciousness’) and also actions and plans (‘action’) triggered by change. Re-
conceptualisation IMs, as they involve a meta-reflective level, usually combine elements from 
both landscapes, integrating them. 
 
 
Levels of Development in Narrative Innovation 
 
In recent works (Ribeiro, Bento, Salgado, Stiles, & Gonçalves, in press; Ribeiro, Bento, 
Gonçalves, & Salgado, 2010), we have been trying to understand the possible role of IMs in 
therapeutic development with the notion of change as a multilevel process. This is inspired in 
the work of Fogel, Garvey, Hsu and West-Stroming (2006) that use this idea in the study of 
early dyadic mother and child interaction. These authors depart from the notion of ‘frame’ as 
their observation unit. Frames are “segments of co-action that have a coherent theme, that 
take place within a particular location (in space or in time), and that involve particular forms 
of mutual co-orientation between participants” (Fogel, Garvey, Hsu & West-Stroming, 2006, 
p. 3). These authors distinguished two typical frames: the ‘guided object frame’ (when the 
mother is guiding the play with the child through the use of objects) and ‘the non-guided 
object frame’ (when the child picks the toy and starts playing with it autonomously, without 
the adult’s help). When studying the mother and child interaction, they noticed changes at 
three levels, each with different implications. A ‘level 1 change’ relates to a “natural” 
variability in the way mother and child play (on one day mother and baby can be playing with 
a ball and on the next day with a doll, but the ‘guided object frame’ is similar, since they 
maintain identical gestures and games towards the object). A ‘level 2 change’ happens when 
an innovation appears within the segment (within the ‘guided object frame’, the child, for the 
first time, throws the object to the ground and the mother picks it up). Finally, a level 3 
change implies a clear developmental change (this can occur if, following our example, the 
child starts playing a new game of throwing and reaching a toy, this time without the help of 
the adult, repeating it over time and stabilizing a ‘non-guided object frame’). 
Applying these three levels to psychotherapeutic change, we could say that, clients enter 
therapy with problematic self-narratives (White & Epston, 1990), in which a redundant theme 
is repeated over and over again, despite the possibility of telling and storying different events 
or situations (a “natural” variability equated to level 1 changes). For example, in depression, 
there is an enduring theme of hopelessness and helplessness in the client’s problematic self-
narratives, while in anxiety disorders, danger and avoidance constitutes the rule or the plot 
connecting the stories together. Once in a while, something different emerges in the stories 
told during therapy as an exception to the problematic rule; that is, an IM (paralleled to level 
2 changes). For example, the client has a different emotional experience that was not 
Innovative Moments in Psychotherapy 9 
congruent with her or his expectations concerning the problem or plans, something divergent 
from the boundaries and power limitations set by her or his difficulties. If these innovations 
are noticed, elaborated and valued as something “interesting” and “worthwhile” by therapist 
and, more importantly, by client, they can lead to enduring developmental transformations 
(level 3 changes). We parallel level 3 changes in psychotherapy to the development of a new 
self-narrative, through the elaboration of IMs that emerge. We will later also discuss the 
processes that allow the elaboration of changes from level 2 to level 3 and also how this 
process can be undermined, leading to the maintenance of the problematic narrative. 
 
 
DESCRIBING THE INNOVATIVE MOMENT CODING SYSTEM 
 
The five types of IMs presented above were systematised in the Innovative Moments 
Coding System (IMCS; Gonçalves, Ribeiro, Matos, Santos & Mendes, in press), a qualitative 
method applicable to various research projects, from single cases to samples from different 
therapeutic models and even interviews about problems outside psychotherapy. The 
application of the IMCS requires at least two trained coders. Their training requires the 
familiarisation with the relevant theoretical notions and coding procedures, through several 
training exercises. We have structured the training in order to develop the various skills 
required for the methodological application of IMCS.  
Then, these two coders engage independently in an initial reading/listening/visualisation 
of the materials (sessions or interviews) in order to be familiarized with the problems under 
analysis and their development. Afterwards, the coders meet in order to discuss and agree in 
terms of what the problematic self-narrative is and the different dimensions that it involves 
(personal, interpersonal, professional, etc). A list of problems is, then, consensually 
elaborated in close approximation to the client’s self-narrative (in terms of words, 
expressions, metaphors). The following independent identification of IMs departs from this 
first step. IMs are always identified in their relation to the previously/initially identified 
problematic self-narrative and it takes into consideration the specificity of the problem: for 
example, the act of “walking away from the situation” can be regarded as an IM in relation to 
a problem of domestic violence; alternatively, in a different case, it can be part of the avoidant 
behaviour that sustains a panic disorder. 
Each session is analysed independently by each coder, according to three steps that result 
in three IM indexes (for further details, see Gonçalves, Ribeiro, Matos et al., in press):  
 
1. Identifying IMs and defining their onset and offset in the session. The temporal 
salience of IMs is then, computed, as the percentage of time (in seconds) occupied by 
each IM. We consider that the duration is a preferred measure to the frequency of 
IMs since it reflects more closely their narrative elaboration. Several indexes of IM 
temporal salience can be computed: we can have an interest in computing the 
temporal salience of each type of IM in each session or the IM temporal salience for 
the entire case (as the mean score of IMs’ temporal salience in all sessions). 
2. Categorizing IMs in terms of the five types (Action, Reflection, Protest, Re-
conceptualisation and Performing Change). 
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3. Identifying who elicited IMs, i.e., who was responsible for their emergence. There 
are mainly three possibilities: a) the IM was explicitly produced by the therapist 
(through a question or commentary about the client), being accepted and further 
elaborated by the client; b) the therapist implicitly triggers or facilitates a client’ 
subsequent IM, through an indirect form (asking, for example: What have you 
learned from this experience?); or c) the IM emerges spontaneously from the client, 
without therapeutic guidance. The decision of which of these three possibilities 
applies to each IM is performed after the other two indexes are addressed. 
 
 
MAJOR FINDINGS OF IMS’ RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
Since the coding of IMs involves the analysis of each session in a therapy case, second by 
second, we have been working with relatively small samples (contrasting successful and 
unsuccessful cases) or conducting intensive case-studies. Up until now, our major findings 
derive from one sample of narrative therapy with women who were victims of domestic 
violence (N=10 participants; Matos et al., 2009), emotion-focused therapy (EFT) with 
depressed clients (N=6 participants; Mendes, Ribeiro, Angus, Greenberg, & Gonçalves, in 
press) and client centred-therapy also with depressed clients (Gonçalves et al., in preparation). 
Additionally, several case-studies from different therapeutic orientations have also been 
studied at a more microanalytic level (Gonçalves, Mendes, Ribeiro, Angus, & Greenberg, in 
press; Ribeiro, Gonçalves & Ribeiro, 2009; Ribeiro, Gonçalves & Santos, in press; Santos, 
Gonçalves, Matos, & Salvatore, 2009; Santos, Gonçalves, & Matos, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 1. Successful and unsuccessful cases in narrative therapy. 
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Figure 2. Successful and unsuccessful cases in EFT. 
We will proceed now to an overview presentation of the EFT and domestic violence 
samples findings, which are also congruent with what we have found in several case-studies 
(Gonçalves, Mendes, Ribeiro, Angus & Greenberg, in press; Ribeiro et al., 2009; Ribeiro, 
Bento et al., in press; Santos et al., 2010; Santos et al., 2009). These studies contrasted groups 
with differential therapeutic outcomes - successful or unsuccessful - distinguished through the 
assessment of symptoms carried out at the beginning and end of therapy. The following 
figures illustrate our main findings in the narrative sample (in Figure 1) and in the EFT 
sample (in Figure 2). 
A first look at these figures shows that the overall temporal salience of IMs is higher in 
successful cases when compared to unsuccessful ones. Nevertheless, IMs also appear in 
unsuccessful cases. A closer look shows us that re-conceptualisation and performing change 
IMs, while present in the successful groups, are almost absent in the unsuccessful samples (in 
EFT performing change IMs are completely absent). These findings led us to enquire about 
the processes that generate these different outcomes and the role that re-conceptualisation and 
performing change seems to play in this development. We will later return to this issue. 
We will now focus on a more process-oriented view through the analysis of two 
contrasting cases of narrative therapy, presented in Figures 3 and 4, which represent 
prototypical cases of successful and unsuccessful therapy. These figures display the evolution 
of the several types of IMs in therapy, on a session-by-session basis (plus the follow-up 
interview at 6 months after the end of treatment). 
In Figure 3, which represents a depiction of IM development in a successful case, we can 
observe an increasing tendency of IMs temporal salience that appears from the beginning of 
therapy. If we look at session two, in particular, we already see ‘action’, ‘reflection’ and 
‘protest’ IMs; furthermore, in session 4, all the five types emerge, continuing to increase their 
presence until the end (see Santos et al., 2009, for an elaborated account upon this specific 
case-study). 
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Figure 3. A successful case in narrative therapy (11 sessions plus follow-up). 
 
Figure 4. An unsuccessful case in narrative therapy (15 sessions plus follow-up). 
Contrastingly, in an unsuccessful case, not only is the temporal salience of IMs lower, but 
its diversity is also much more restricted. As we can see in Figure 4, which represents the 
development of IMs in an unsuccessful case, reflection and protest IMs are present but they 
are not followed by re-conceptualisation and performing change IMs, as we see appearing and 
increasing in successful cases from the middle stage until the end of therapy. In other words, 
most of the time, action, reflection and protest IMs are present in unsuccessful cases from the 
beginning until the end of therapy (and can even slightly increase their temporal salience) but 
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the differences in terms of overall temporal salience are clear as far as successful cases are 
concerned.  
To summarize our global findings in terms of IMs’ emergence and evolution in therapy, 
we can say that successful cases are typically characterized by a progressive tendency in the 
diversity and temporal salience of IMs from session to session. In the beginning of therapy, 
action, reflection and protest IMs start emerging and becoming more prominent as the 
treatment progresses. These IMs are then followed by re-conceptualisation that emerges in the 
middle of the process and continues increasing until the end. Performing change IMs tend to 
appear after re-conceptualisation. In turn, unsuccessful cases are typically characterized by a 
lower diversity and temporal salience of IMs, with action, reflection and protest being the 
main IMs, most of the time without a clear trend to increase from the beginning until the end 
of treatment. Re-conceptualisation and performing change IMs do not appear typically or 
have a very low temporal salience. 
An interesting commonality between both groups is, to us, the presence of IMs from the 
first session until the end, regardless of the therapeutic outcome. This means that, if we took 
the terminology of Fogel and collaborators (2006), level 2 changes appear in therapy even 
when the final outcome is poor. In other words, even when the problematic narrative 
dominates in the beginning and keeps its power balance unchanged until the end, there are 
always novelties appearing and opportunities for new narratives to be developed, even if they 
are ignored, trivialized or dismissed after their emergence. 
According to our studies, these results in the context of psychotherapy were also 
replicated in daily life changes (i.e., changes related to personal problems, transitions and 
processes of adaptation to life events that occur outside the therapeutic context). Cruz and 
Gonçalves (in press) conducted an exploratory study based on interviews with a non-clinical 
population that asked participants (N=27) to identify three types of difficulties in their lives: 
past (and solved) difficulties, current difficulties (in the moment of the interview) and 
persistent difficulties (present for more than 6 months). In this study the presence of re-
conceptualisation IMs was the characteristic that distinguished solved from present 
difficulties (with statistically significant results). Furthermore, a similar study by Meira 
(2009; see also Meira, Gonçalves, Salgado & Cunha, 2009) on non-therapeutic change with a 
longitudinal design replicated the same findings about ‘re-conceptualisation (17 participants 
were interviewed about a personal problem every couple of weeks, for four months). 
The consistency of these findings within and outside the therapeutic context suggests that 
re-conceptualisation is a key factor for sustaining narrative changes and the construction of 
new self-narratives. In the next section, we will elaborate upon a model of narrative change, 
supported by the several findings presented above and other case-studies that systematically 
pointed to the same results. 
 
 
A MODEL OF NARRATIVE CHANGE IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
In our view, narrative change implies not only diversity of IMs but also specific 
interrelations between them. Due to the complexity of self-changes, it is unlikely that 
sustained changes could develop from a specific type of IM (Gonçalves et al., 2009). So, 
according to our findings, change starts with IM diversity, namely in the form of ‘action’ and 
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‘reflection’ IMs. These are more elementary forms of innovation that appear as early forms of 
opposing the problematic self-narrative (being level 2 changes). Nevertheless, these IMs are 
vital since, if recognized by the self and validated by others, they become the first signs that 
something new is taking place and that change is on its way. These novel actions, thoughts or 
intentions, either triggered by the therapist’s questions or spontaneously recognised by the 
client, defy the dominant problematic themes that prescribe redundant behaviour. The way 
these innovations appear can be quite idiosyncratic to the person or situation: sometimes they 
appear through new actions that lead to new thoughts and intentions, other times through new 
insights about the problem’s maintenance that feed new actions. We have also noticed protest 
IMs present from the first session on, in some cases. This can be due to the fact that not all 
clients enter therapy at the same stage of change (see Prochaska, DiClemente & Norcross, 
1992). Some seek therapy already engaged in an active state, while others are still very 
contemplative and ambivalent and may take more time reflecting and exploring the problem 
before they gather enough motivation to enter in more active stages (Prochaska et al., 1992; 
see also Gonçalves, Ribeiro, et al., in press). We consider protest IMs an interesting type of 
innovation since they trigger a strong attitudinal movement against the problem and entail 
new positioning of the self in relation to the surrounding world.  
Independent of the starting point, the idea is that these three forms of IMs keep feeding 
each other and amplifying their occurrence. For example, as the person starts recognising that 
the avoidance of certain activities only maintains the problem of fear, she might decide and 
plan to start doing small things that defy the problem (reflection IM) and actually starts re-
experimenting in his or her daily life with previously abandoned activities (action IMs) while 
at the same time protesting frequently in therapy towards the problem’s assumptions (protest 
IMs).  
At a certain point of therapy (usually in the middle of the process) re-conceptualisation 
IMs start to appear. We contend that these IMs are very important to the consolidation of 
further narrative changes, given that unsuccessful therapeutic processes and non-resolved 
personal problems usually do not exhibit them.  
Since re-conceptualisation IMs are grounded in two important features: a) the contrast 
between present and past and b) a meta-level narration of the processes that made this 
transformation possible, they seem to be a type of narrative which is more complex than the 
previous IMs. As we have argued before, not only is its structure closer to the structure of a 
story (given its sequencing of events and higher narrative coherence), but it also gives a meta-
level view of the agent in a story about change. In this sense, it pictures the actor in a given 
path towards self-transformation and, at the same time, frames the story in a new narrative 
perspective from the author (the person positions him or herself as different). Furthermore, 
these IMs also foster other action, reflection and protest IMs, acting like a meaning-making 
gravitational field towards future production of meanings and experiences. Since the person – 
as a changed narrator – assumes a different authoring position towards the self and the world, 
his or her narratives give coherence to the several types of novelties, acting as a meaning 
bridge (Osatuke & Stiles, 2006) between the old and new versions of the self. Thus, re-
conceptualisation has the power of integrating old patterns into new ones, through a synthesis 
process (Santos & Gonçalves, 2009).  
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Figure 5. A heuristic model of successful psychotherapy. 
Finally, performing change IMs emerge and represent the expansion of the change 
process into the future, as new experiences, projects and intentions emerge due to the 
transformations achieved. The future projection of a story is vital for an expansion of new 
self-narratives: as several authors suggest (Crites, 1986; Omer & Alon, 1997; Slusky, 1998), 
new stories need to have a future. Figure 5 illustrates the processes described above in 
successful psychotherapy. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mutual in-feeding producing a dynamic stability between opposing voices. 
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We consider that all the variability that occurs within the problematic self-narrative (dark 
rectangle at the left of figure 5) is related to level 1 change that obeys the usual “rules” of the 
problem (for example, when the client narrates being vulnerable to the fear over and over 
again, despite the differences in events and situations). The emergence of IMs, in the middle 
section between the double braces, represents level 2 changes: something novel that is 
emerging and being noticed by the participating agents. Nevertheless, we think that the 
emergence of re-conceptualisation IMs is the starting point of a flow of processes that lead to 
level 3 changes: the development of a new self-narrative (pictured at the right of the figure 
above). This is the distinguishing feature between successful cases and unsuccessful ones. So, 
the next logical question is to enquire about what processes occur in unsuccessful cases that 
do not trigger developmental changes. Or, more specifically: What processes interrupt the 
emergence of re-conceptualisation IMs in unsuccessful cases? 
 
 
A MODEL OF NARRATIVE STABILITY IN PSYCHOTHERAPY 
 
If we compare the initial stages of successful and unsuccessful cases, they seem quite 
identical: action, reflection and protest IMs are present (although in some unsuccessful cases 
the temporal salience of these IMs is lower from the beginning). Clearer differences reside in 
the middle of therapy when, in the absence of re-conceptualisation, the potential power to 
foster change of the three previous IMs, is not built upon and amplified. Thus, despite some 
innovations, the person returns to the same narrative, not being able to challenge its 
dominance.  
Exploring the processes that prevent the emergence of re-conceptualisation and, thus, 
facilitate the dominance of the problematic self-narrative, involves taking into account IMs 
potential to challenge a client’s usual way of understanding and experiencing, generating 
uncertainty. IMs can be easily understood as episodes of self-discontinuity and, thus, 
uncertainty (Gonçalves & Ribeiro, in press; Ribeiro & Gonçalves, 2010). We have argued 
that the development of IMs into a new self-narrative depends on the way people manage the 
emergence of uncertainty. Ignoring or avoiding uncertainty, by returning to the problematic 
self-narrative and, thus, attenuating IMs’ meaning, in order to promote a sense of continuity 
or coherence, may sustain the maintenance of the problematic self-narrative. The following 
example shows how, although the client elaborates an IM, its meaning is soon attenuated by a 
return to the problematic self-narrative that restores self-continuity (i.e., reinstates the power 
of the problematic self-narrative):  
 
Clinical vignette 6 
Client: Sometimes, I feel able to face my fears... I feel this strength inside me Reflection 
IM, but then it suddenly disappears, as if my fears return and takeover! Continuity 
restoration by returning to the problematic self-narrative 
 
When uncertainty is not overcome during the therapeutic process, the problematic self-
narrative and IMs may establish a cyclical relation that blocks the development of the self. 
This process is akin to what Valsiner (2002) described as ‘mutual in-feeding’: a dynamic 
balance between two contrasting voices in the dialogical self (e.g., voice A: “life is good”, 
voice B: “life is bad”) that feed each other in a perpetual movement back and forth. The 
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voices seem to be moving and quite unstable, but the dynamics actually remain the same as 
time goes by. It is a case of stability through a very dynamic process in the dialogical self. In 
our clinical example of a person with panic disorder, in the first sessions he or she could 
express a voice A that says “I am afraid of leaving home alone” and voice B that says “I must 
overcome my fears in order to become more autonomous”. According to the IMs coding 
system, voice A is an expression of the problematic self-narrative, while voice B expresses a 
reflection IM. Despite the novelty, they could be feeding each other infinitely, in a redundant 
back and forth movement that keeps the person within the same vicious cycle (see Figure 6). 
Furthermore, this back and forth movement between voice A and voice B can even lead 
to a more striking polarization of meanings, in what Valsiner (2002) calls ‘mutual escalating’ 
of voices. The most interesting thing is that, despite the small variability gained through the 
oscillation between the voices as time passes, the relationship between them remains the same 
as it was in the beginning. 
The process of mutual in-feeding has been addressed by other authors in different 
theoretical perspectives. In personal construct theory, it is sometimes referred to as ‘slot 
rattling’ (Kelly, 1955), a dance between two poles of the same construct. In strategic therapy, 
it is related to the ‘ironic process’ (Shoham & Rohrbaugh, 2002) of first order changes that 
only lead to an escalation of the problem (Watzlawick, Weakland & Fisch, 1974). And in the 
assimilation model of Stiles and collaborators (Brinegar, Salvi, Stiles & Greenberg, 2006) this 
is paralleled with a ‘rapid crossfire’ between two divergent voices.  
 
 
Figure 7. A heuristic model of unsuccessful cases. 
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We have been empirically observing the phenomenon of ‘mutual in-feeding’, by 
analysing whether IMs present ‘Return-to-the-Problem Markers’, as in the following 
example:  
 
Clinical vignette 7 
Client: “This week I decided to face some of my fears as we agreed in the last session ... I 
decided to go to the mall [Reflection IM], but when I was on my way to the mall, I was 
suddenly caught by an incredible agitation. I felt I couldn’t breathe, as if I had a cramp, 
but I could do nothing. [RPM] 
 
A study recently conducted by our team with the sample of women who were victims of 
domestic violence contrasted the successful group with the unsuccessful group to explore 
whether there would be significant differences in terms of the percentage of IMs with RPMs. 
As we suspected from the argument presented before, our results in this sample indicate that 
the unsuccessful group had a significantly higher percentage of IMs followed by RPMs 
(namely action, reflection and protest).  
Our results also suggest that the presence of mutual in-feeding is rare in re-
conceptualisation. One possible reason for this is that these IMs already dialectically integrate 
both opposites (past and present or, in other words, problematic voice and innovative one), 
making it difficult for an oscillation between them. Performing change IMs also escape this 
process of mutual in-feeding because they tend to emerge only after re-conceptualisation, 
being more characteristic of later stages of therapy. Moreover, according to the definition of 
performing change IM, they are the anticipation or planning of new experiences and projects. 
Since these projects and new experiences appear as a generalisation of the change process 
into other life domains and into the future, it is likely that they are not involved in a return to 
the problem. Figure 7 summarizes the processes that occur in unsuccessful cases. 
We initially tried to understand mutual in-feeding mainly through the analysis of 
unsuccessful cases, but we concluded, later on, that this vicious cycle, although typical of 
unsuccessful cases (Santos et al., 2010), is not exclusive to them (Ribeiro, Bento et al., in 
press). Thus, it is important to note that successful cases also presented signs of mutual in-
feeding that are surpassed as therapy progresses. The dialogical processes that allow 
evolution from mutual in-feeding to another type of dialogical relation and the role of the 
therapist in it are important dimensions that still need to be studied. 
In this sense, we are now directing our research efforts to the exploration of the role of 
the therapist in these two specific situations: a) in the promotion of IMs – particularly in the 
facilitation of re-conceptualisation, and b) in the surpassing of mutual in-feeding. Up until 
now, we only have analysed data from case-studies (Cunha, Mendes, Gonçalves, Angus & 
Greenberg, 2009; Ribeiro, Loura, Gonçalves, Ribeiro, & Stiles, in preparation). These 
preliminary findings indicate that the promotion of IMs is usually associated with the 
previous use of more directive interventions from the therapist (namely, direct guidance in 
therapeutic in the midst of therapeutic tasks or open questions to facilitate self-awareness). 
Focusing now on the therapist’s response to mutual in-feeding, preliminary findings indicate 
that mutual in-feeding tend to persist during therapy when the therapist respond to it by 
understanding predominantly the innovative voice (by amplifying it), instead of 
understanding the problematic voice (trying to explore what it is in the client’s experience 
that prevents change). In such cases, clients might feel that the therapists do not understand 
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them, invoking a “strong reactance on the part of the client, often hardening the client’s stuck 
position” (Engle & Arkovitz, 2008, p.390). Instead, surpassing of mutual in-feeding, involves 
empathic understanding not only for innovative voice(s) but also for problematic one(s) 
(Stiles & Glick, 2002).  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Although at this point we cannot infer a causal relationship between mutual in-feeding 
and re-conceptualisation, our data suggests that the emergence of re-conceptualisation is 
strongly associated with a decreasing in the mutual in-feeding.  
This integrative power of re-conceptualisation tends to give coherence to the meaning of 
other IMs and gives directionality to the change process, thus beginning to dissipate the 
redundancy of the problem in clients’ daily lives. The recognition of oneself as different and 
the awareness of exceptions to the problem can start a ‘domino effect’ (Watzlawick, 
Weakland & Fisch, 1974) that leads to a level 3 (developmental) change and to successful 
psychotherapy. Furthermore, since re-conceptualisation implies the contrast between past and 
present, and aggregates the old self with the transformed self, it achieves a new sense of unity 
in the dialogical self, surpassing the former dualities and ambivalence usually inherent to a 
mutual in-feeding process between opposing voices. The self’s multiplicity of experiences 
and perspectives become integrated in a more flexible way, with new resources at its disposal 
to deal with difficulties and a future-oriented view that triggers and amplifies new 
performances of change. 
One of the powerful processes entailed by re-conceptualisation that, in our view, is 
responsible for this, is the development of a meta-position, allowing for a self-observation 
process. Through self-observation, new insights are created and new connections are 
established (see Castonguay & Hill, 2006 for a comprehensive discussion of insight in 
psychotherapy). This facilitates the development of a new sense of personal agency and the 
commitment to a new way of life where, through repetition, the novelties become familiar. 
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EMPATHY AND EMOTION FROM THE PERSPECTIVE 
OF DIALOGICAL SELF THEORY 
 
 
Thorsten Gieser and Hubert Hermans 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Empathy has a long history in psychology and philosophy, and rightly so. It has been 
described as a phenomenon in its own right, as an ability, as a state of mind, as an emotional 
state. But it is more than that. It is what enables us to transcend our self, to acknowledge and 
understand other people as experiencing subjects like ourselves. Ultimately, it is even the 
attempt to putatively experience what someone else is experiencing. In this sense, empathy is 
a fundamental aspect of human relationships, of two selves in communication. We can see 
now why empathy is so important for understanding the dialogical self. Not only does it 
provide us insights into how a self can go 'beyond the skin' of the individual; it also tells us 
something about dialogical relationships, which rely on our ability to assume exterior 
positions, to experience them as I-positions, and to give them a 'voice'.  
To illustrate these points we look at empathy in the psychotherapeutic context, where so 
much depends on conversations and a developing 'spiral of understanding' between client and 
therapist. To start with, we present a brief history of the concept of empathy followed by a 
first interpretation in terms of dialogical self theory. We then move on to introduce a case 
study drawn from Alfred Margulies' classic work The Empathic Imagination (1989). Our 
discussion of the material starts by showing how spoken words, as evocative sounds, can 
create perceptual and emotional imaginary landscapes that can be experienced by both client 
and therapist. What is more, the therapist might even feel into this landscape as if it were his 
own, thereby sharing the client's perceptions and emotions to a degree. We argue that a state 
of 'first-order phenomenology' (Lambie & Marcel, 2002), an experience of emotional 
immersion, is necessary for empathy to develop and that it is the 'secondary-order awareness' 
of emotion which transforms this process of 'feeling-into' into a process of distancing. Both 
processes, so we propose, are essential for the therapeutic success. To complicate the matter, 
we then demonstrate that a closer look at the emotions involved in our case study reveals that 
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shared perceptions do not necessary result in the same shared emotion. Through a detailed 
description of the empathetic process in terms of dialogical self theory we explicate how 
different parts of the therapist's and client's selves, both interior and exterior, relate to each 
other and to different levels of emotion, especially 'primary' and 'secondary' emotions 
(Greenberg, 2002). Distancing ourselves from the confinement of the case study, we conclude 
this chapter with an elaboration on the importance of empathy for dialogicality and the 
dialogical self in general.  
 
 
EMPATHY AS SHARED PERCEPTION 
 
The term empathy is the translation of the German word Einfühlung ('feeling-into'). 
Titchener (1909) created the word from the Greek en pathos (‘in suffering/passion’) by 
analogy with the word ‘sympathy’ (see Wispé 1986 and 1991 for elaborations on the 
sympathy/empathy distinction). The concept of Einfühlung was first used by psychologists 
within the field of aesthetics and form perception in the last quarter of the 19
th
 century. They 
understood that aesthetic appreciation demands a projection of the self into the object of 
beauty (Wispé, 1990, p. 18). At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, the concept was transferred 
from the context of subject-object relationships to that of subject-subject relationships, i.e., to 
the question of how we know others (e.g., Lipps, 1903; 1905). According to Lipps, we can 
feel into the emotions of others by seeing shame in the blushing, anger in the clenched fist, or 
joy in the radiant smile (Stein, 1964, p. 70). It was in this sense that the concept of empathy 
was subsequently employed in various psychological sub-fields like personality theory, social 
psychology, developmental psychology, and – most importantly for this paper – in 
psychotherapy (see Duan & Hill, 1996; Eisenberg & Strayer, 1990 for reviews).  
 
The definitions employed to date describe empathy in various related ways that may be 
translated as sympathizing with someone, feeling with/for someone, responding to someone, 
understanding, participating, being sensitive to someone, or taking the role of the other. Carl 
Rogers, one of the advocates of empathy in inter-personal relationships, defines it in terms of:  
 
“Entering the private perceptual world of the other and becoming thoroughly at home in it. It 
involves being sensitive [...] to the changing felt meanings which flow in this other person... It 
means temporarily living in his/her life [...] It means frequently checking with him/her as to 
the accuracy of your sensings, and being guided by the responses you receive [...] To be with 
another in this way means that for the time being you lay aside the views and values you hold 
for yourself in order to enter another world without prejudice.” (1975, p. 4, our emphases) 
 
More recently, empathy has been understood as a complex multidimensional 
phenomenon that includes both cognitive and affective components and control systems, and 
that varies in degree with personality factors, relational factors and situational context (see 
e.g., Vreeke & van der Mark, 2003 or Preston & de Waal, 2002 for recent elaborations). It is 
not our intention here, however, to analyse empathy in all of its aspects in any detail. 
Following in Carl Rogers' footsteps, our concern is rather with an interpretation of empathy as 
a mode of shared perception and emotion.  
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EMPATHY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF DIALOGICAL SELF THEORY 
 
We assume that empathy is both a dialogical and a self-related phenomenon. A dialogical 
perspective is needed in order to understand the relationship between people as involved in a 
process of cognitive and affective interchange. A self-perspective is required to understand 
how dialogical processes between people are intimately related with dialogical processes 
within the selves of the participants. Therefore, “dialogical self theories” in which the notion 
of self and dialogue are conceptually combined, are useful to analyze how people involved in 
empathetic communication establish meaningful relationships not only between each other 
but also between different aspects of their multifaceted selves. In their first inception of 
dialogical self theory, Hermans, Kempen, & Van Loon (1992) criticized the assumption that 
the self is organized around one centre or core. Rather than conceptualizing the self as 
organized from a centralized headquarter, they proposed a (partly) decentralized self that is 
extended to the world with the social other as not purely outside but also inside the self. 
Instead of considering the self as a centralized agent with a unifying view on the world, the 
authors conceived the self in terms of a dynamic multiplicity of relatively autonomous ‘I-
positions’ that are organized in an imaginal landscape. In this conception, the I is always 
bound to particular positions in time and space but has the possibility to move from one 
position to the other in accordance with changes in situation and time. In this process of 
positioning and repositioning, the I fluctuates among different and even opposed positions, 
and has the capacity to imaginatively endow each position with a voice so that dialogical 
relations between positions can develop that renew and innovate positions involved. Such 
dialogical relationships are contrasted with monological relationship in which one or a few 
positions are dominant in the self, with the result that other positions are silenced or 
suppressed or otherwise not allowed to speak from their own specific point of view.  
In order to understand empathy from the perspective of dialogical self theory, it is 
necessary to make a distinction between two kinds of I-positions (a) internal ones that refer to 
personal and social aspects of the self (e.g., I as a professional, I as a perfectionist, I as 
vulnerable) and (b) external positions that refer to people or aspects of the environment that 
are felt as belonging to the self (e.g., my father, my colleague, my friends, my house). In other 
words, I-positions are not only aspects of the self that are located “inside the skin” but also 
aspects that are, in the sense of James (1890), constituents of the self as extended to the world. 
An empathetic person has the capacity to understand the internal and external positions of the 
other and of oneself in their differences, addressivity, responsiveness, and power dynamics. A 
person who is empathetic is building up a new landscape in his own self in which both the 
internal and external positions of the other are constructed and reconstructed in their mutual 
dynamic relationships, as if he is the other. When empathy develops, the internal and external 
position repertoire of the other becomes increasingly familiar to the empathic person both in 
its content and organization. Empathy becomes really dialogical when the empathic person is 
able to respond to the other by developing a new space in his extended self in which the 
position repertoire of the other is interiorized and reconstructed, but also able to address the 
other in such a way that the position repertoire of the other receives a new developmental and 
integrative impulse. As part of this process the empathetic person develops a feeling for the 
power dynamics in the position repertoire and gains insight in the organization of the 
repertoire in which some positions are dominated or even suppressed by other ones. As a 
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result of the addressivity, responsiveness, and insight in the power dynamics on the part of the 
empathetic person, the other feels not only understood but also liberated and renewed.  
 
 
THE CASE EXAMPLE: A NIGHTMARE 
 
The case example used here is drawn from Alfred Margulies’ classic work The Empathic 
Imagination (1989). In this book, Margulies presents a phenomenological account of empathy 
in his everyday clinical practice. One of his examples deals with the nightmare of a client:  
 
“My son and I were going to a park, just for a walk. We were separated – no, he ran 
ahead and I started to go up into town, [...], and I started to go up the road between two 
buildings. There was a feedmill [sic] and a bridge or a walkway connecting two buildings and 
there were men hanging from the walkway and grabbing people as they walked that way. And 
my son was ahead of me and I went another way and I got to the park. And there was this row 
of doors, and I kept opening the door to see if my son was there and he wasn't – and I was 
absolutely terrified and then I woke up. And I kept thinking something had happened to him 
and he wasn't there. And I thought I wasn't there and if he cried out I wouldn't be there.  
The other part of the dream that stands out is the road that was around the feed mill – it 
was full of ruts and like covered with shit and very slippery and difficult to walk on. And I 
remember looking down at it and I was surprised and I just kept walking...” (Margulies, 1989, 
p. 55)  
 
At this point, the client begins to associate and leaves the immediacy of her dream and 
Margulies brings her back, asking her to describe the scene further:  
 
“It was surprising to me. It was sort of [...] the thing was, it was slippery and full of ruts. And 
I didn't want to fall down. It was like I thought I wouldn't get out – but I did. I remember there 
being a building and the road coming down out of the building and down the hill and when I 
was on the hill, that's when I realized what it was. It was full of ruts, and not soft, but hard and 
I was sinking into it and I was sliding over it, afraid I'd fall [...] There wasn't a smell. It was 
sort of like coming upon it and being surprised and when I realized what it was, but rather 
than being caught up, I had to get where I was going, I had to get to the park. Being more 
scared kept me from being bogged down.” (Margulies, 1989, p. 55) 
 
As the client describes this dream in more detail, Margulies has an unexpected empathic 
experience:  
 
“Throughout this narrative I had been forming another impression that was like a deja vu 
to me. I had experienced it before, though it felt strange and uncanny to me, a compound 
sensory image that she had once described with vivid and distressing affect. The mental 
representation I had was strong with a slippery feeling, a tactile and kinesthetic sensation that 
was not part of her original description of the event or even how I recalled it as told by her, 
but that now seemed integral. I hesitated to comment, wondering if this image were my 
projection onto her dream [...] Awkwardly I decided to go with my hunch, 'I am not sure of its 
relevance, but it reminds me of the scene you once described of being a little girl and 
watching the pigs being slaughtered – I don't know if it's the slippery part of the image that 
seems a part of it, though you hadn't described it that way.'  
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'It's funny,' she reflected, 'That was sort of blood and guts, and slippery. There was a barn 
there – a red barn. Its [sic] like when you hang a pig up after you slaughter it; it's like those 
men hanging in the dream ... just suspended there...'  
'Like slaughtered pigs?' I say.  
'Yeah, the way they were suspended. The feed mill in the dream was old and painted red 
too. Last night I went outside in the garden to plant holly hocks... they were blossoming. My 
neighbour grew them.'  
I think holly hocks, ham hocks. 'The neighbour who had the pig slaughter?'  
'Yes!' she laughs, 'I also remember once sliding down her walkway during a light snow 
and I ran right into her husband and knocked him down.' He was the one who slaughtered the 
pigs.” (Margulies, 1989, p. 56) 
 
This session ended and Margulies took up some of its loose threads later on. Together 
with his client, he explored the role of violent men in her life and tried to reconnect 
compartmentalized episodes of violence that she had witnessed and dreamt of.  
 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Now, to make explicit the empathetic processes involved in this case a model of the self 
is needed that is capable of showing the organisation of positions and the dynamics of 
positioning on which empathy relies. In dialogical self theory one of the best models is that of 
the Personal Position Repertoire (PPR) (see Hermans, 2001), a matrix of external and internal 
positions that makes up one's 'society of the self'. By describing and interpreting empathy in 
terms of a PPR we are able to access complex patterns of dialogical relationships and follow 
the dynamics of movement between positions; not only within one self (the client or the 
therapist) but also between selves. What we mean by that will become clear shortly.  
At the start of the therapy we can assume that Margulies introduced his client as a new 
external position in his (PPR). This new position is still quite ‘hollow’: with a face, a name, 
perhaps a few snap judgements about her general appearance but without an awareness of her 
life history, her character traits, her significant others or the power dynamics that govern her 
relationships. During the course of the next therapeutic sessions, he gradually elaborated her 
one position into a full set of internal and external positions (a full external PPR). And here 
we go beyond the original formulation of the PPR as conceived nearly a decade ago. Other 
people are rarely present in the PPR as one solidified external position; they are usually 
present as complex patterns of their internal and external positions as we know them. 
Simplified, yes, we relate to others from an internal position to an external position. But more 
realistically, this external position is made up of many facets and constitutes a whole PPR 
within ours. In Margulies's case, he heard more and more about her life, more and more 
people were introduced to him, and the client became invested with personal, individual traits 
and stories. For example, the client told him about her career, the family finances, her 
marriage, her son, her father’s obsession with hunting, her fascination for violent men, and so 
on. These narratives not only introduced ‘significant others’ as external positions to the 
therapist, but also gave insights into her internal positions (e.g., the mother, wife, the anxious, 
etc.), together with their relationships and power dynamics in her life.  
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At the same time, something else is going on. Within the PPR of the therapist, the newly 
formed positions of his client are simultaneously linked not only within the network of the 
client’s other positions but also with the past experiences of the therapist himself. In 
Margulies’ own words:  
 
“As I become engaged with the inner life of another, I experience a growing sense of 
familiarity with a built-up internal landscape. Oftentimes this is not so conscious to me. I enter 
a private world constructed from associations and images stimulated by my patient and drawn 
from my own personal past experience.” (1989, p. 53) 
 
Thus we learn more about the process by which positions are created. As soon as they 
'enter the stage' (to use a metaphor Hermans, 2001, used in describing the PPR), positions are 
exposed to the 'pulling power' of already established positions that resonate with them in 
some way. There must be 'recognition', in some sense, of the other in me, that draws the new 
position towards the old. It is as if the established positions gaze at a simulacrum appearing 
and tentatively probe into it, trying to discern whether this simulacrum is a mirror of 
themselves or a new external position in its own right. From the quote above we may 
conclude that the more 'associations' one finds the greater the pull and recognition.  
But before we elaborate on the importance of this pull and recognition of positions for 
empathy let us briefly explore why and how positions can appear as simulacrums, especially 
in the therapeutic context. It is important to remember here that narratives, especially in the 
therapeutic context, are not simply descriptive reports but re-lived experiences (see Jackson, 
1998). Put differently, “stories are lived before they are told” (MacIntyre, 1984, p. 212). The 
words of narratives bring to life once again the sensual experiences of a more or less distant 
past: the sight of the son running away from her, a slippery road full of ruts and covered in 
excrements, the feeling of her sinking into and sliding over the ruts, the marvellous absence 
of any smell in this situation. These words re-create, in both telling client and listening 
therapist, the world of the 'dreamscape', and with each new sentence, with each new piece of 
sensory information, this dreamscape becomes more real and experience-able. But it is not 
only the words of the story told that enrich the dreamscape. The remembered sensual 
experiences themselves open up a whole world of other emotions and memories, as so 
pointedly remarked by Marcel Proust who once lost himself in memories when he tasted a 
madeleine:  
 
“But when from a long-distant past nothing subsists, after the people are dead, after the things 
are broken and scattered, ... the smell and taste of things remain poised a long time, like souls, 
ready to remind us, waiting and hoping for their moment, amid the ruins of all the rest; and 
bear unfaltering, in the tiny and almost impalpable drop of their essence, the vast structure of 
recollection.” (2006, p. 210) 
 
Likewise, the anthropologist Tim Ingold (2000, p. 409) argued that “words gather their 
meaning from the relational properties of the world itself. Every word is a compressed and 
compacted history”. Margulies remembered a particular instance in his work that illustrates 
this point clearly:  
 
“As I gain greater familiarity with the world of the other, I then have a Proustian echo of 
recollection. With one patient, for example, I recall a farm in my mind’s eye, the fields, the 
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roads, the old lady who fed the patient/me ginger snaps and bananas – all experiences I have 
lived empathically through her. I do not recall in my own life whether I have ever even had 
ginger snaps and bananas together, but I can almost taste them on my mind’s tongue. 
Moreover, I sometimes recollect such empathic sensations more readily than does the patient 
from whom I have learned them!” (1989, p. 54)  
 
These recollections are again more than re-lived sensual experiences; they are filled with 
emotional experiences as well. According to Antonio Damasio (1999), each perceived (social 
and natural) environmental stimuli becomes associated with particular body signals (the 
emotion) and are thereby ‘marked’ with positive (e.g., happiness or pride) or negative values 
(e.g., fear or disgust); values that make us either approach or retreat from the stimulus. 
Emotions are hence understood only in their relationship between individuals and the world 
they live in and perceive. To 'speak' about a past experience evokes the same relationships 
that became associated with the emotions in the first place.  
Two consequences arise from the above: First, when the client’s dialogical self within the 
PPR of the therapist crystallizes, it does so with certain emotional values attached. Her 
emotional reactions are either being verbally expressed; being expressed by changes in tone 
of spoken words; or being visible in facial expressions, gestures and body posture (see 
Ekman, 1999). Second, when we follow Damasio’s hypothesis, listening to the client’s 
emotional accounts (and watching her bodily emotional expressions) create an emotional 
response in the therapist as well. In this context, Ingold (2000, p. 21) argued: “To show 
something to somebody is to cause it to be seen or otherwise experienced”. Analogously, to 
tell somebody something is to cause it to be heard or otherwise experienced. As almost every 
perception is accompanied by emotion, to draw attention to something is not only a statement 
of what it is but also of how it is. It is a statement not just of a word but also of a relationship 
between narrator, the words and the world that they denote. To follow someone’s pointing 
finger, or words in this case, is therefore to become involved in a relationship, or, in other 
words, to feel into a relationship.  
The therapist feels into the client’s relationships by attending to her in a sympathetic 
mode in order to establish rapport. He is therefore likely to respond to her emotional 
expression with a similar one, perhaps accompanied by a compassionate feeling. When 
hearing about something the therapist is also familiar with (e.g., having a son, problems in a 
relationship), his past emotional reactions will become associated, too. Margulies remarks:  
 
“It is not merely my reaching into resonant experience from my own life (for example, that I 
have, parallel to the patient, fond boyhood memories of eating cookies and feeling happy and 
secure). It is more: I now have memories empathically derived and elaborated into a relatively 
coherent form from someone else’s experience... I reach deep down into my internalized 
inscape of the other.” (1989, p. 54-55)  
 
The emotions felt now establish a link to the client such that both focus their attention on 
the same aspects of her inner landscape, sensually as well as emotionally. Margulies was 
dwelling in his client’s inner landscape, which he built up in his own PPR. But not merely as 
an observer. He perceived this landscape from the client’s position, hence as a déjà vu. In 
terms of the dialogical self, this means that one of his inner positions (e.g., his feeling of 
strangeness) related to the external positions of the client (e.g., her son who disappeared). 
However, these external positions should normally be related to the client self positions, not 
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to the therapist self positions. Two things must have happened. First, the boundaries between 
client self positions and therapist self positions must have loosened so that her positions can 
be experienced as belonging to the sphere of the therapist self positions. Second, the client 
self positions must have been silenced in order for the therapist to have a first-person 
experience of the dream and not simply an observation of what the client is doing in the 
dream story.  
How is it possible that the therapist experiences the memories of his client as his own in 
these moments? We have already mentioned two aspects of the answer. First, the telling of 
the client’s narratives has created an emotional link between the emotional values the client 
attached to the characters of her stories and the emotional response of the therapist that arose 
while he listened to her. Second, in the empathic moment the client’s narratives evoked 
a detailed, meaningful, inner landscape both in herself and the therapist. We shall finally 
point to a last answer to this question by bringing in an analogy with the phenomenologist 
Merleau-Ponty’s concept of duplicité, that is the phenomenon of 'touching and being 
touched'.  
When we shake hands, for example, we can either feel our hand shaking another person’s 
hand or our hand being shaken by somebody else. We can voluntarily switch our focus of 
attention to either feeling, knowing that the other feeling is never out of reach. Similarly, we 
can use our right hand to touch, for instance, a table, with our left hand being passive. Again, 
we always know that the passive hand can become active if we wished so. On the basis of 
these realisations, a ‘transfer of sense’ can take place which allows us to perceive the hand of 
another person in a similar way as we perceive our own passive hand. We are able to feel into 
the experience of another person’s hand because of its similarity to our own hand. We have 
experienced our hands as both perceiving subject and perceived object (often with one hand 
being part of the background of the active hand that is in our focus of attention). As we 
experience the other’s hand as object in the same background, we may experience the other’s 
passive hand then like we experience our own passive hand.” (Merleau-Ponty, 2003, p. 223 
and 225)  
We argue that a similar bodily logic is at work when we empathize through speaking and 
listening. Whenever we speak, we simultaneously hear our voice. We may be so involved in 
our speaking that we merely hear our voice while in other instances we may actively listen to 
what we are saying. Our voice can hence be understood either in our ‘hearing background’ or 
‘listening focus’ (Ingold, 2000). Whenever we have a conversation, we hear our own voice 
and the voice of the other. Moreover, in a friendly conversation we also tend to adjust our use 
of words or phrases, pronunciation and intonation to our fellow conversant. This enables us to 
feel into the experience of another person's voice because of its similarity to our own voice. 
What further contributes to this empathy is that, in the course of a conversation, we 
experience a continual switching of attentional focus, between our voice either in the 
background or in focus and the other's voice either in the background (e.g., when both of us 
speak simultaneously) or in focus. In either case, our voices become linked in one experiential 
Gestalt and hence we may feel into another person’s narratives as if they were our own.  
However, the thus created sensory and emotional bond does not lead the client and the 
therapist to have identical emotions. If we recall, the client said she felt “afraid” and “scared” 
for her son. We can also infer from her statements about the slippery road surface - full of 
excrements, and the fact that she was trying to avoid falling into this mess – that she felt 
disgusted. Now Margulies, on the other hand, did not share her concern for the son but 
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instead felt something “strange” and “uncanny” in connection with a “tactile” and 
“kinaesthetic” feeling of slippery-ness. It seems like Margulies was – sensorily – in the 
narrated dreamscape, together with her, but the world opened up to him through these 
sensations was different from hers. For her, the feeling of being disgusted by the slippery road 
surface was a compound sensory and emotional image linked up with being scared for her 
son. For him, the tactile and kinesthetic feeling of slippery-ness was linked with a feeling of 
slippery-ness from another episode of the client's life, namely her memory of a pig slaughter 
scene. It was the inconsistency or discrepancy between his and her experience of the 
relevance of this perception (of slippery-ness and what it meant) that led to his strange and 
uncanny feeling.  
Margulies mentions that his client once told him about the “blood, squealing and 
slaughter” of this memory with “vivid and distressing affect”. We could describe this original 
affect as the client's primary emotion (Greenberg, 2002), the initial response to a concrete 
stimulus situation. In her dream, the slippery surface and the red barn are drawn from this 
original experience and should have brought up the primary emotion once again. Yet it was 
obscured by a new situational secondary emotion of being scared (for her son). According to 
Greenberg (2002), secondary emotions often cover a deeper emotion which a person might be 
afraid to acknowledge. Consequently, the client focused her attention on the feeling for her 
son rather than the distressing memory of slaughter and violence.  
In a way, Margulies expected unconsciously for the primary emotion to come up in the 
client and his empathetic bond to her loosened when he realised that his and her experience of 
the scene differed (he suddenly had a “strange” and “uncanny” feeling). Listening to her 
story, he re-lived the dream with her in a state of what Lambie and Marcel (2002) call first-
order phenomenology. In this state, one lives the emotion without being aware of the fact that 
one has an emotion or what nature this emotion is. Margulies' sudden feeling triggered his 
attention which led to a second-order awareness (Lambie & Marcel, 2002) of the emotions 
that he and his client shared empathetically a moment ago. As we have previously argued, 
when Margulies empathetically relived the story of his client (in a state of first-order 
phenomenology) he experienced her external positions as his own while the boundaries 
between his and her PPR must have become highly permeable. Second-order awareness, then, 
re-establishes the boundaries between their PPRs, introduces some distance between the 
therapist's and the client's positions, and thereby leads to a renewed acknowledgement of the 
client's interior positions by the therapist. From Margulies' perspective, we could say that the 
distance between the reflective I and my emotion generates a perceived distance between I 
and You. Awareness of the shared emotion, then, breaks the empathetic link and re-introduces 
the distinction between me and the other which was meaningless a moment ago. It opens up a 
'space for dialogue' that enables the recognition of multi-perspectivity, multi-positionality, as 
well as positional history and context (see Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010).  
Yet the question remains how the therapist could empathetically share his client's 
perceptions and emotions in a state of first-order phenomenology and then suddenly have a 
different perceptual and emotional experience in their shared narrated dreamscape. We 
suggest the answer to this question lies in the fact that the client's PPR in the therapist's PPR 
developed primarily through listening to her stories. But whereas the client's own PPR in her 
dialogical self is intimately linked with her positional histories and contexts, the therapist 
creates a client's PPR in his dialogical self that relates to other positions in the client's stories 
and his personal positional histories and contexts. In other words, his own perceptions, 
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memories and conceived meanings influence his experience of her inner landscape. Yet 
because Margulies acquires only a condensed version of her positional histories through the 
stories, in some respects his experience of her PPR may be more condensed or focused than 
hers. Silencing his own histories, he focuses on her without being easily distracted by 
associations that would lead her away from the current experience. Hence he might have a 
strong 'tactile' and 'kinesthetic' experience of the slippery surface that she did not have. Her 
PPR was far too diversified to pay attention to such a small detail. Furthermore, her 
secondary emotion led her to focus her attention on the son rather than on the situation which 
might have led to recognize her primary emotion linked to the slaughter memory.  
So it was a differing sensory perception (together with its emotional tone) that made 
Margulies feel something 'strange' and 'uncanny', which – in turn – let him recognize that 
there are actually two I-positions in the narrated dreamscape: he is only accompanying his 
client there; it is not his dreamscape. Nevertheless, he recognized something important that 
she did not. Once he realized this, his task was to make her perceive what he had perceived; 
in other words, to make her perceive her dreamscape from a different I-position: not her as in 
I-am-scared-for-my-son, but her as in I-am distressed- by-this-slaughter-imagery. In this way, 
she could acknowledge that she was present as two I-positions in her dream and then start a 
dialogical relationship between her two positions. Thereby she might access the message the 
primary emotion holds for her (about the role of violence and violent men in her life).  
As we see at the end of the dialogue presented in the first part of this chapter, the 
reflective process triggered by the therapist (as a 'promoter-position' in the self of the client, 
so to say) led her to explore various aspects of her primary emotion which eventually result in 
her laughing. We may interpret that as the start of a 'counter emotion', a helpful response to an 
initial emotion (Hermans & Hermans-Konopka 2010), developing which might have a 
positive influence on her ongoing therapy and a repositioning of herself in her PPR.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
We may ask, what purpose has empathy then for the therapeutic process as a whole? 
Margulies’ answer to this question is that it starts a ‘spiral of understanding’ where client and 
therapist sensually explore the now shared inner landscape and thereby uncover more and 
more meaningful aspects in the client’s life history.  
 
“In an edge-of-consciousness way I entered my patient’s separate experiences, which then 
remained in my mind with their own intense sensory traces, ready to come to life. Despite the 
ultimate unknowability of the other, there was a coherence of world view that I could 
approximate from within my own distinctive world view. Moreover, this coherence extended 
into the shadows of her inscape, into its dormant possibilities. That is to say, the inscape of 
this other person had its heretofore unelaborated absence-in-presence that became 
articulated in my own mental representation of her experience. It was through the empathic 
dialectic that I then brought into consciousness my experience of her inscape, which was then 
affirmed in her connecting to my connections, pushing the spiral of understanding further. We 
explored reflected inscapes together, me blind and imagining, her frightened and recoiling.” 
(1989, p. 57, our emphasis in bold print) 
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The last sentence highlights that these moments of shared experience are not only 
empathic in nature. They are but moments, accompanied by other moments where the 
therapist only guides the client through her inscape, or has to distance himself even more 
from her in order to reflect on what he was told. The psychotherapeutic process described in 
this chapter is therefore a dynamic process of distancing and feeling into, of emotional 
reflection and emotional immersion. But we would also like to take it a step further and argue 
that empathy, broadly conceived, is more than a complex psychological phenomenon; it is the 
ontological basis of dialogue and dialogical relationships as such. Too often we tend to 
narrow down the notion of dialogue to an interplay of words (see Gieser, 2008 for an 
alternative embodied approach). Yet this case study has shown that what makes dialogue 
possible in the first place is an ability to feel into someone else's positions, perceptually and 
emotionally. The 'spiral of (cognitive) understanding', that is the dialectic aspect of 
dialogicality, does not only rely on the recognition of distance between positions, a 
fundamental distinction between I and Thou alone. Dialogue needs also the merging of 
positions, the overcoming of distance. Without empathy we would not know how to assume 
another position - internal or external – and thus would not be able to 'connect to connections', 
as Margulies put it.  
That the latter point is essential to the dialogical self has most recently been pointed out 
by Hermans and Hermans-Konopka (2010) who described the dialogicality of emotion as 
follows:  
 
“We assume that an emotion is dialogical when it meets a real, remembered, imagined or 
anticipated position in the other or the self and is influenced, renewed, understood, consoled 
or, in the broadest sense, influenced by that position in a way that the emotion, and the self 
more in general, is developing to some higher level of integration.”. (p. 29)  
 
The key word here is “integration”. To integrate means to open oneself, to allow oneself 
to be affected and touched (the Latin tangere in 'integration'), to affect and touch others, and 
to draw this experience together to form a whole that is an extension of the self, a dialogical 
self. If we thus speak of dialogicality we mean this continuous movement between positions, 
of feeling into and distancing, alongside the static turn-taking points of a dialogue. As we 
have seen, just to listen to someone draws us into their world and them into ours. A dialogue 
is not only a linguistic phenomenon; it is a perceptual and emotional basis for empathy.  
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Chapter 10 
 
 
 
GENDER, EMBODIMENT, AND POSITIONING  
IN THE DIALOGICAL SELF: 
DO MEN AND WOMEN SEE EYE TO EYE? 
 
 
Peter Raggatt 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“…the self experiences his external body (the one the Other sees) as a series of disparate 
fragments, dangling on the string of his inner sensation.” (Ann Jefferson, 1989, p. 154) 
“No matter how much you think you’re making sense they’re still looking at your 
boobs.”  
Melissa Madden Gray, 2008, p. 7 
 
These quotes point in different ways to the phenomenology of our embodied social 
relations. In sharing experience there is always a spatial and experiential ‘gap’ to be 
negotiated, suggesting that dialogue will always be constrained by our different positions. Our 
bodies are an important part of this dialogical (dis)engagement. The quote from Jefferson 
evokes the quandaries of the mirroring experience – the image we see of ourselves in the 
mirror is always incomplete and can never match the view that others see. We can only make 
a guess about the other’s view. The second quote, from a popular Australian feminist comic, 
is also rich in signification. It parodies the gender wars; implies a predatory sexuality in men; 
and references the ‘objectification’ of women’s bodies. But the joke can also be read as 
giving a social (gendered) context to the same disengagement between self and other 
proposed in Jefferson’s more dispassionate phenomenological description. 
Notwithstanding these observations the topic of ‘embodiment’ has received only limited 
attention in discussions of the dialogical self, perhaps because notions of dialogue and 
‘dialogism’ invoke the spoken word as primary medium. In this chapter I will address aspects 
of embodiment as a form of positioning within a dialogical self theory (DST) framework. I 
will also report some findings from a survey of positioning and embodiment amongst midlife 
adults. Taking the lead from Gray’s observation, I will focus specifically on the interaction of 
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gender with body image representations, and consider how these relate to positioning in a 
DST framework. The findings point to problems of cross-gender communication and conflict 
that can be illuminated using DST. I will conclude with an alternative dialogical interpretation 
for Gray’s wry observation about men looking at her boobs.  
 
 
DIALOGICAL SELF THEORY 
 
I begin with an overview of DST and consider some specific extensions of the theory that 
are a part of the research approach taken here. Drawing originally on James (1890), Bakhtin 
(1981, 1929/1984), and Mead (1934), Hermans (2001; Hermans & Kempen, 1993) has 
defined the dialogical self as a dynamic multiplicity of several ‘I-positions’ in the landscape 
of the mind, each position voicing a different view of the self in an ongoing dialogue with the 
world. I think several key principles underpin this theoretical linkage of self with dialogue, 
summarized here in point form:  
 
(i)  First there is really no transcendental, core, or super-ordinate self in a dialogical 
approach. The theory posits different voices positioned in the person as well as 
between persons. The self emerges in this field of dialogue (Raggatt, 2010). 
(ii)  Second, different I-positions are emergent ‘in’ and ‘over’ time (the synchronic and 
diachronic dimensions are both important). I-positions, thus constituted, have both 
local specific action patterns and extended historical/narrative coherence and 
continuity (see Raggatt, 2006).  
(iii) A corollary of (ii) is that positioning implies change, but also continuity. I-positions 
suggest oscillations of the self in time, but the concept of ‘storied voice’ implies 
continuity through time as well.  
(iv)  Finally, I-positions are frequently described by individuals in terms of paired 
opposites (see e.g., Raggatt, 2000, 2002, 2006). I have argued that the coordinates of 
these oppositions can be explained by both intra-personal (reflexive) and inter-
personal (social) positioning (Raggatt, 2007).  
 
In the present approach the way persons construe conflict is viewed as crucial to 
positioning and hence to the formation of the self. It follows then that a theory of positioning 
will require further elaboration in the future if a dialogical approach to the self is to prosper. 
In the next section I address this topic briefly, before turning to a discussion of gender and 
embodiment in relation to positioning. 
 
 
POSITIONING THEORY 
 
Looking ‘inside’ individuals, positioning implies oppositions and tensions between 
voiced locations. Here I focus on the task of analysing opposed I-positions in a person’s 
narrative accounts of self, as distinct from a positioning analysis of specific micro-social 
happenings. This distinction suggests that positioning theory has a range of different 
applications and proponents. The social constructionists have focussed on the flux of 
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positioning in settings ranging from micro-social dyadic encounters to diplomatic exchanges 
between nation states (e.g., Harré & van Langenhove, 1991, 1999; Harré & Moghaddam, 
2003; Hollway, 1984; Gergen, 1991). Constructivist and narrative-based approaches, on the 
other hand, began by focussing on positioning processes in personality and in individual 
development across time (e.g., Hermans, 2001; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010; 
Hermans & Kempen, 1993; Raggatt, 2006, 2007). The concept of positioning therefore has a 
wide range of convenience. It can be applied to what happens in conversations; it is 
constructed in relationships; it shapes the stories we tell; and it is often imposed by the 
political and social order (Raggatt, 2007). With this scope and flexibility in mind the 
approach taken here acknowledges the necessity to understand positioning in terms of both 
individual and social coordinates.  
The approach that I use to code positioning processes is derived from a classificatory 
scheme developed in earlier work (Raggatt, 2007). In that work positioning was classified in 
three domains: (i) mode of expression, (ii) reflexive (or personal) forms, and (iii) socially 
constituted forms (Raggatt, 2007). Table 1 summarizes this classificatory scheme. No claims 
are made that the scheme is universal or comprehensive. It should be considered a ‘work-in-
progress’ model. Referring to Table 1, in panel (a) under modes of expression are included 
the Narrative/Discursive, which is the medium of storytelling (Bruner & Kalmar, 1998; 
Freeman, 1993; Raggatt, 2010); the Performative/Expressive, which incorporates role play, 
stagecraft, and scripting; and the Embodied, which incorporates body image, non-verbal 
expression, and body adornment. Aspects of these elements can be coded in life history data 
(discussed later). The codes for reflexive positioning, shown in panel (b), were derived from 
the broad literature on ‘intra-psychic’ conflict in the person: Esteem – to maximize positive 
self-evaluations and minimize negative ones
1
; Affective - to maximize pleasure and minimize 
pain; Agentic – to act in the world as an independent being; and Communion-Oriented - to 
find intimacy, attachment and connection in the world (Bakan, 1966; McAdams, 1993)
2
. 
Socially constituted positioning (the last panel of Table 1) may take many forms. I have 
focussed here on the effects of power in social settings involving hierarchies. At least three 
forms meet this criterion: occupational/status conflict, gender conflict, and social class 
conflict. Their inclusion recognizes that social positioning is sanctioned by power differences 
which give rise to uncertainties and to tensions in various social settings
3
. Gender conflicts 
are, of course, one important arena for these tensions, and it is to this topic that I now turn. In 
the next section I address the question of how differences between the sexes might be 
expressed within a positioning framework.  
                                                        
1
 Modern notions of self esteem are linked to the much older idea of ‘moral career’ and to the problem of how to 
lead a good life (McIntyre, 1981). These concerns are reflected culturally in Campbell’s (1956) monomyth of 
the hero fighting dark forces (on the inside as well as outside), and in Propp’s (1928/1968) classic analysis of 
folk tales, in which plot resolves down to a confrontation between a hero and a villain. Hence, from the 
perspective of reflexive positioning of the self, we may each be the containers for internalized heroes and 
villains. 
2
 The dynamic force behind agency is an existential need: By what consuming project or set of projects can my life 
take on special meaning (Sartre, 1965)? How is power to be exercised? Communion, on the other hand, 
addresses the problem of how to find love and companionship in the world. Who can one care for and who can 
one trust? The dialectical tension between agency and communion is widely recognized in the psychological 
literature. For example, the psycho-analytic (Bakan, 1966; Freud, 1920/1955), personological (Hermans & 
Kempen, 1993; McAdams, 1985) and social psychological traditions have all been concerned with agency and 
communion as sources of psychological conflict (Wiggins, 2003). 
3
 See Raggatt (2007) for an extended discussion of all these positioning forms. Space restrictions do not allow 
further treatment here. 
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Table 1. Forms of positioning in the dialogical self 
 
(a) Medium of Expression  
Narrative/Discursive storied self; autobiography; narrative voice 
Performative/Expressive role play; scripts; rituals 
Embodied  body image, costume  
(b) Reflexive   
Esteem Conflict good self vs. bad self 
Agency Conflict strong self vs. weak self 
Communion Conflict intimacy vs. separation 
Affect happy self vs. sad self 
(c) Social   
Occupation/status Conflict  boss vs. subordinate 
Social Class Conflict higher vs. lower 
Cross-Gender Conflict patriarchy; masculinity vs. femininity 
Note: Criteria for coding forms of positioning based on this classification system are: 
1. Narrative presence of narrative accounts linking opposed positions;  
2. Performative presence of role play (e.g., work roles) linking opposed positions; 
3. Embodied  presence of body image links among opposed positions;  
4. Esteem  presence of good self/bad self positions; 
5. Agency  presence of strong self/weak self positions; 
6. Communion  presence of intimacy vs. separation-related positions; 
7. Affect  presence of happy self/sad self positions; 
8. Occupation  presence of power differential arising from work/status conflict; 
9. Cross-Gender presence of power differential arising from cross-gender conflict ; 
10. Social Class presence of power differential arising from social class conflict. 
 
 
POSITIONING, GENDER, AND EMBODIMENT 
 
There has been little systematic empirical inquiry into positioning as a feature of the 
dialogical self in individuals, let alone a consideration of how important social categories 
such as gender might interact with these processes (Raggatt, 2008). Concerning the interface 
between gender and positioning, there is an extensive empirical literature inquiring into 
gender differences from which to draw some direction. It is not my intention to review that 
literature here. Instead, we can draw from it some pointers to gender differences in 
positioning. For example, in a real-world event-sampling study conducted in a large 
organization, Moskowitz, Jung Suh & Desaulniers (1994) found that females were more 
attuned to intimacy and affiliation needs in randomly sampled work situations regardless of 
status-relevant context (interactions with supervisors versus co-workers). Males, on the other 
hand, were more sensitive to the status-relevant context. These findings were significant 
because the researchers sampled everyday events as they happened, rather than relying on 
retrospective recall or on reports of attitudes and beliefs. More generally in research on social 
motives the literature suggests that females are typically more attuned to verbal 
communication and intimacy concerns, while males are more individualistic and concerned 
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with status (e.g., Bakan, 1966; McAdams, 1989, 1993; McAdams et al., 1988; Stewart & 
Chester, 1982).  
Assuming that these differences between the sexes are real
4
, they can be evaluated by 
examining positioning in the context of how males and females construe the dialogical self. 
First, in the domain of reflexive positioning (Table 1), if females have more ‘relational’ selves 
(Josselson, 1994) they should prioritize intimacy and connection vs. its absence in opposing I-
positions. Hence we would predict gender differences in communion-oriented positioning 
with this being more apparent in the self-positioning of women. On the other hand, if males 
are more concerned with social dominance (or its lack), then we would expect them to 
construe more agency concerns in their positioning conflicts. Second, from the perspective of 
social positioning (see Table 1), if females are positioned as less dominant and more 
“compliant”, it could be predicted that gender-related interpersonal conflicts will be more 
salient for women. 
Another domain in which differences have featured strongly in research findings 
involving gender is body image. The object relations theorists have used a broad definition 
for body image which is closest to the usage intended here. Feldman (1975) defines body 
image as “the sum of the attitudes, feelings, memories and experiences an individual has 
towards his own body – both as an integrated whole, and in respect of its component parts” 
(p. 317). Hence, ‘body image’ can be unpacked so that it is not in the ordinary sense a 
singular image so much as a collection of images
5
. Previous research suggests that women 
experience greater body image distortions than men, and they have repeatedly been found to 
have lower body image satisfaction (e.g., Cash & Henry, 1995; Penkal & Kirdek, 2007; 
Sondhaus, Kurtz & Strube, 2001; Tiggemann, 2004). How might such body image 
differences be reflected in gendered positioning? Since the method of evaluating the DS to be 
described here includes body image measures, and since the conceptualization of positioning 
used here includes ‘embodiment’ as one mode of expression, we can address this question 
here. 
In terms of existing theory linking gender, embodiment, and positioning, Frederickson 
and Roberts (1997) have attempted to explain gender-specific body image differences using 
‘objectification theory’. The theory holds that women, more than do men, learn to assess their 
own value as a function of how they believe their bodies are viewed by others, particularly 
men – in other words, they ‘self-objectify’. Hence, the body becomes the sight of 
imperfections imagined to be on display for others. Frederickson and Roberts propose that 
Western women in particular, when compared to men, learn to assess their own value as a 
function of body image (dis)satisfaction. The result is a heightened focus on grooming and 
other (body) image-enhancing behaviours for women relative to men, greater anxiety about 
appearance in women, and, some theorists argue, a diminished confidence in other evaluative 
contexts unrelated to appearance (e.g., Davis, Dionne and Shuster, 2001).  
Assuming that female self-objectification is widespread in Western cultures one might 
expect greater salience for body image in the positioning conflicts of women compared to 
men. For example, one might predict that for females esteem conflicts (reflexive positioning) 
                                                        
4
 I will not address at this point the question of whether these differences can be explained by gender stereotypes. 
5
 For example, the eyes can symbolize or represent friendliness, openness or sociability, the shoulders may 
represent ‘strength of character’, while the belly may stand for more negative attributes, such as laziness. It is a 
short step from there to conceptualize body image constituents as an important potential source of self-
representations. 
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will interact with body image concerns (embodied positioning), and that women would 
generally hold more negative perceptions of their bodies.  
In what follows, interactions between gender, positioning and body image are explored 
empirically. Two general propositions will be examined: (i) that there will be gender 
differences in positioning, and (ii) that measures of body image, gender and positioning will 
show interactions.  
 
 
A SURVEY OF THE DIALOGICAL SELF: METHODS 
 
The findings to be reported here form part of a larger ongoing project that examines the 
DS using life narrative methods. The data comes from 109 adults who were enrolled as 
mature age students in undergraduate courses at James Cook University in Australia (mean 
age was 31 years). They were predominantly white and middle class, and females were over-
represented relative to males (33 males, 76 females). To investigate the dialogical self I use a 
life narrative-based assessment method (or more correctly, set of methods) that is designed to 
‘map’ I-positions in the individual. The assessment procedure is called the Personality Web 
Protocol (PWP). It has been described in detail elsewhere (Raggatt, 2000, 2006) and so here I 
will confine my description to an abbreviated synopsis. The method can be combined with in 
depth semi-structured interviewing to yield detailed case studies (e.g., Raggatt, 2000, 2002, 
2006). Alternatively, it can be adapted, as in the approach described here, to a pen and paper 
version in the form of a battery of instruments eliciting both quantitative and qualitative data. 
The procedure can be summarized as follows: 
 
1.  Informants list and describe 24 life history constituents or ‘attachments’. The list 
must include 6 significant people, 6 life events, 8 objects and places, and 4 body 
part constituents. Liked and disliked, or positive and negative exemplars of each 
component type are elicited
6
.  
2.  Informants sort their constituents into typically between 2 and 4 associated groups 
or clusters that define different self-relevant life themes and narratives.  
3.  Informants label each cluster with a self-relevant identifier (e.g., creative self, 
spiritual self, victim).  
4.  Informants are interviewed about their life history constituents and thematic 
clusters, or alternatively, they write commentaries on them. 
 
For present purposes, as noted the data analyzed comes from a survey battery version of 
the PWP in which participants listed, sorted thematically, and labelled life history constituents 
and then wrote commentaries on the product of this exercise. Figure 1 shows a conceptual 
model for examining ‘oppositions’ in the life history thematic clusters derived using the PWP 
methodology. In Figure 1, the data collection and analytic process is summarized in the form 
of a flowchart. Life history constituents (people, events, etc.) are listed first. They are then 
                                                        
6
 The list of material generated included: two liked associates, two disliked associates, and a liked and disliked 
public figure; peak (happy) and nadir (sad) experiences described from childhood, adolescence, and adulthood; 
valued possessions, important places, and influential books or works of art; and four body part constituents 
(e.g., the eyes) that were respectively ‘liked’, ‘disliked’, ‘strong’, and ‘weak’. 
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sorted into associated groupings as defined by the informant (using the broad criterion of 
“self-relevant themes in thinking, feeling and experiencing”). The informant then provides a 
self-relevant label for each cluster. It is these clusters, their formation and particularly their 
opposition, that are the focus here. In the final phase of the analytic process, opposing clusters 
in the informants’ protocols are coded for positioning. For this analysis the positioning 
classification system outlined previously and shown in Table 1 was used.  
 
 
Table 2. Sample protocol: I-position clusters, descriptions and commentary from a 
female participant, aged 29 
 
1. Positive Self “Brings together the positive, good and inspiring things in my life” 
Mother “she has always supported me in regard to traveling and learning”. 
First plane flight (aged 8) “with my mother”; (excitement, joy) 
Joining RAAF  “I learnt lots of good things about myself” (excitement, pride)  
Travel to Europe With partner; “a dream come true”; (happiness) 
Going to Uni. “I feel more confident”; (happiness, eagerness) 
2. Negative Self “I have a negative self …my childhood experiences with my father 
have been a dominating factor.” 
Father “put-downs coupled with drunken behavior and emotional abuse.” 
(anger) 
Dispute - father “father was drunk and was trying to load a gun. Mum took the gun”. 
(fear) 
Lost bicycle “my father abused me and told me how bad it was and that I deserved 
it.” 
End Relationship “huge self-doubt and lack of self-worth. I felt that I couldn’t trust 
anyone.”  
My thighs “I have cellulite, surface veins ands stretch marks.” (insecurity) 
Sweaty hands/feet “I have hyperhydrosis (a medical condition) which is where there is an 
over-reaction of sweat glands. It worsens with anxiety.” (embarrassed) 
3. Artistic Self “I have always loved theatre, art and creativity. I feel that even  though 
I haven’t pursued theatre, it really is my calling.” 
Cate Blanchett “I like the roles she plays. I admire her devotion to her husband and 
life.” 
Sir Peter Ustinov “I enjoy watching his character and the distinct sound of his voice.” 
Fancy dress “I have fun when I portray a character and watch people’s reaction.” 
Painting “Special because it is old…fine and delicate”; (creativity) 
4. Feminine Self “I love being a woman – an equal woman. I accept the differences with 
men and I enjoy these differences. I love being a feminine shape.” 
Tailored suit “It makes me feel professional and important, as well smart and 
beautiful.”  
Sexy dress “I enjoy wearing this dress. It shows my womanly curves.”  
My calves “I have always liked my calves as they look strong, athletic, and sexy.” 
My body “My body is all intact and I have ‘normal functioning’”.. 
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Figure 1.  
 
Coding the Protocols for Positioning 
 
Two independent judges with postgraduate training were used to code for positioning. 
The task required the judges to indicate the presence vs. absence of the expressive, reflexive, 
and social forms of positioning listed in Table 1. The coders were instructed to read synopses 
of the data provided by each informant. Table 2 shows a sample protocol from a 29 year old 
female participant. The protocol is typical of the sample in key respects. There is a pair of 
opposing I-positions she has called simply a “positive self” and a “negative self”, and two 
other positions defined as “artistic” and “feminine”. Note that the embodied mode of 
expression is important to both the “negative” and “feminine” positions. It was these 
protocols that were used to code for positioning. 
The coders made judgments in two phases. In the first phase, the presence of opposing I-
positions in the protocols was coded. It emerged that for 95 (86%) of the sample there was at 
least one pair of opposing I-positions. The coefficient of inter-judge reliability for this task 
was 0.94. In the second phase of coding, the pairs of opposing I-positions were marked, 
separately, for the presence/absence of first the expressive, then the reflexive, and finally the 
social forms of positioning. The mean co-efficient of inter-judge reliability for the second 
phase of the coding procedure was 0.88, and disagreements were resolved or the code entry 
was not scored.  
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Computation of Body Image Indices 
 
In order to analyze the body image data in relation to positioning and gender, a series of 
body zone indices were constructed from the body part constituents reported on the PWP
7
. 
This was necessary because the frequencies for individual body part references on the PWP-
Q, e.g., to the legs, nose, or hands, were relatively low (a notable exception was the eyes). To 
address this problem, indices based on body zones or regions were compiled. Four zones were 
identified from the PWP-Q data: the face (e.g., eyes, nose, mouth, hair), torso (shoulders, 
chest, stomach, back), lower body (butt, legs, thighs, calves, etc.) and body organs (brain, 
heart). Separate indices for positive references (‘liked’ and ‘strong’ body parts), and negative 
references (‘disliked’ and ‘weak’ body parts) were computed for each of these four body 
zones. Thus, for interpretation purposes, dichotomous (presence-absence) variables were 
created depending on whether participants had reported any one of the body constituents 
comprising each zone, and both positively and negatively loaded indices were created.  
 
 
SURVEY FINDINGS: INTERACTIONS OF GENDER  
WITH POSITIONING AND EMBODIMENT 
 
Table 3 shows frequencies (in %) broken down by gender, for the positioning codes 
[panel (a)] and the body image measures [panel (b)]. Since both the positioning codes and the 
embodiment measures were dichotomous, 
2
 (Chi-Squared) tests were computed to look at 
patterns of association with gender, and these are also reported in Table 3. With regard first to 
frequencies for the positioning codes in the sample as whole, frequencies for two of the codes 
-- the Narrative/Discursive and the Social Class Conflict codes -- were severely skewed and 
so no meaningful 
2
 comparisons on gender could be reported for these measures. Among the 
reflexive positioning codes, Communion and Esteem conflicts were the most frequently 
coded (45% and 38% of the total sample respectively). Among the social positioning codes, 
Cross-Gender Conflict was coded most frequently (39% of the sample). In the embodiment 
data, references to parts of the face (71% of the sample) and the torso (58% of the sample) 
were the most frequently reported.  
Looking now at the frequencies broken down by gender and at the 
2
 tests for sex 
differences on the positioning codes [panel (a) of Table 3], first, there were no differences 
between the sexes on the expressive positioning codes. Notably, embodied expression was 
coded as frequently in the opposed I-positions of males as females (about 42% of protocols 
for both sexes). Hence the prediction of greater embodied conflict for females was not 
supported. However, there were marked gender differences in the results for both the reflexive 
and social forms of positioning, and these were largely in accord with predictions. Female 
protocols were coded for both Communion and Cross-Gender conflicts at significantly higher 
frequencies than for males, as had been predicted. Female protocols were also coded for 
Esteem conflicts (Good Self/Bad Self I-positions) at twice the frequency of males, and this 
was also statistically significant. Males, on the other hand, were nearly twice as likely to 
represent internal conflicts in terms of Agency themes, a difference that was also statistically 
                                                        
7
 Recall that informants were required to list and comment on a ‘liked’, ‘disliked’, ‘strong’, and ‘weak’ body part. 
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significant. With the possible exception of the differences on the code for Esteem, these 
gender effects are consistent with the research literature on social motives reviewed earlier. 
Further, the differences in reporting Cross-Gender conflicts may reflect real gender-based 
power differentials in the community sampled. This finding reinforces the importance of 
social positioning factors for identity conflicts, factors that may be outside individual agency 
or control.  
Panel (b) of Table 3 shows the results of tests for gender differences on the body image 
indices. Here there are some intriguing interactions. The 
2
 tests reveal gender differences on 
the face, torso, and lower body indices. Females in the sample made significantly more 
positive references to the face on the PWP-Q (59% of females), and this was at nearly twice 
the rate of males (31%). Males, on the other hand, made significantly more negative 
references to the face (35%), at more than twice the rate of females (13%). For this sample 
then, it would appear that positive I-positions are signified in facial features for females only, 
while the males did the reverse, signifying negative I-positions in facial features. As expected, 
females were more negative than males in construing their torsos and lower bodies. Males 
produced significantly more positive references to their torsos in the protocols (
2
 = 3.56, 
p>0.05), while females made significantly more negative references to their lower bodies (
2
 
= 4.05, p>0.05).  
In summary the females in the sample construed their faces positively and their lower 
bodies negatively in the context of their I-positions, while the males construed their faces 
negatively and their torsos positively. These findings suggest that there are different processes 
of embodying the self in men and women. More light may be shed on this by looking at 
higher-order (three-way) interactions between gender, the positioning codes, and the body 
image measures. Since gender co-varies with both the positioning and body image data, the 
possibility of higher-order interactions can be explored. For example, since there were strong 
gender differences in the way the face was represented (positively by females, negatively by 
males) we might explore whether such patterns of difference interact with positioning. To 
address this question Log-Linear Analyses (based on 
2
) were performed to search for three-
way interactions between gender, the positioning codes and the body zone indices. Two 
contrasting effects were detected. First, there was a significant three-way interaction between 
gender (being female), Esteem conflicts, and the positive Face index (
2
 = 5.08, p>0.05). 
Second, there was a significant three-way interaction between gender (being male), Esteem 
conflicts, and the positive Torso index (
2
 = 3.44, p>0.05). I think we can interpret these 
interactions within the framework of dialogical self theory in terms of two distinct patterns.  
The women embodied healthy esteem through their faces while the men did this through 
their torsos. In short, in females conflicts involving esteem, communion, and cross-gender 
conflicts were more important than for males, the face was the sight of positive I-positions, 
and ‘disliked’ and ‘weak’ body parts were focussed in the lower body. In males, conflicts 
over agency (strong-weak I-positions) were more salient, the face was construed negatively 
rather than positively, and positive I-positions were given embodied expression through the 
torso.  
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Table 3. Gender comparisons on the positioning and body image measures 
 
 Frequency df Phi 
 2
Males Females 
(a) Gender x Positioning 
Narrative 85.2  88.4     
Performative 27.3  17.1  1  -.12  1.48 
Embodied 42.4  42.1  1  .01  0.01 
Esteem 21.2  40.8  1  .19  3.88* 
Agency 39.4  22.4  1  -.18  3.34* 
Communion 24.2  48.7  1  .23  5.67** 
Affect 21.2  26.3  1  .05  0.32 
Occupation/Status Conflict 21.2  11.8  1  -.12  1.61 
Cross-Gender Interpersonal Conflict 21.2  46.1  1  .24  5.99** 
Social Class Conflict 10.1  11.7    
 (b) Gender x Body Image Indices 
Face Index  positive 31.0  59.4  1  .26  6.74** 
negative 34.5  13.5  1  -.24  5.85** 
Torso Index  positive 37.9  20.2  1  -.19  3.64* 
negative 37.9  31.0  1  -.07  0.44 
Lower Body Index  positive 21.0  20.8  1  -.01  0.01 
negative  6.9  24.3  1  .20  4.05* 
Body Organ Index  positive 20.6  30.0  1  .09  0.86 
negative  6.9  16.2  1  .12  1.54 
N = 109. 
* p<0.05, ** p<0.01. 
 
 
IMPLICATIONS: DO MEN AND WOMEN SEE EYE TO EYE? 
 
Here I want to make some observations about embodied communication, particularly 
keeping in mind the quotes from Jefferson and Gray with which I began this chapter. We 
might ask for example whether any new understandings about embodied processes of 
positioning can be gleaned from the findings described here. First, it needs to be reiterated 
that there will always be uncertainty about our own embodied expression in the world. This is 
because of a fundamental disengagement from the other’s view. As Jefferson (1989, p. 154) 
observes, the image we see of ourselves in the mirror is but one “disparate fragment, dangling 
on the string of [our] inner sensation”. Perhaps this fundamental uncertainty is implicated in 
the disengagement between the genders over issues of embodiment, even when accounting 
for the effects of patriarchy and gendered oppression? Certainly, a feminist interpretation can 
not be discounted because the findings presented here are in some respects consistent with 
Frederickson and Roberts (1997) ‘objectification theory’. The females in the sample were 
more negative about their lower bodies than were the males. One possible resolution is to read 
the conflicts between the sexes over the body as arising out of two positioning processes, one 
based on the ‘objectification’ of women through social positioning, and the other arising out 
of uncertainties about self-embodied expression that we all share, but which the sexes perhaps 
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handle differently (reflexive positioning). To put this another way, differences between the 
sexes in self-embodied representations arise not just out of conditions of patriarchy and 
gendered oppression, but also out of our fundamental blind-sightedness to the other’s view of 
our bodies. Males and females may handle this problem quite differently.  
Returning now to Melissa Madden Gray’s (2008) wry observation that “No matter how 
much you think you’re making sense, they’re still looking at your boobs” (p. 7) -- notice that 
the gendered disjunction observed in the present findings is captured nicely in this jibe. That 
is to say, while Gray is ‘speaking her mind’ (and thinking she is making sense) her 
interlocutors are staring at her breasts. Putting aside for the moment the allusions to male lust 
and sexual aggression, on the one hand, and female ‘honour’ and opprobrium directed at men, 
on the other – the sub-texts in the joke – perhaps we can re-interpret the disengagement here 
in terms of fractured dialogues and failures of embodied communication across gender 
boundaries? That is to say, perhaps there is a deep disengagement between the sexes with 
respect to the way the body maps onto conceptions of the self? A disengagement that can not 
be fully explained in terms of gender wars over the ‘objectification’ of female bodies. Hence, 
while the male gaze may drop to a girl’s torso and lower body, as it does in the joke, the male 
can be positioned as ‘looking out’ - speaking - from his own torso. That is, he prefers to 
speak with his good self from a site with an embodied focus in his own torso (not his head or 
face). Women, on the other hand, resist this kind of ‘objectification’ because they are looking 
out – speaking – from their faces. The female preference is for embodying desired selves in 
the face, not parts of the lower body. The findings reported here suggest that males do not 
share this preference. In consequence this dialogical disjunction becomes grist for the mill of 
sexual confusions, sexual politics, and feminist jokes. 
Is there any evidence in the literature on body image that is congruent with the findings 
here? Several studies describe a similar pattern of findings. When Sondhaus, Kurtz and 
Strube (2001) examined body satisfaction in relation to self-esteem in a large sample of 
college students, they found that academic success was positively related to body satisfaction 
only in males. In the females, academic success was related to body dissatisfaction. It is not 
clear that this result can be explained fully in terms of patriarchy or Objectification Theory. 
When Feldman (1975) asked anorexic women to rate satisfaction with a range of body parts 
(including the face, hands, breasts, belly, and buttocks), the pattern of findings matched the 
present ones for females, but in an amplified way. That is, the anorexic women expressed an 
intense dislike for their lower body parts, but liked their faces a great deal. Since the beauty of 
a woman’s face might also be the subject of objectification, it is not clear that objectification 
theory can account for the way females embody esteem through the face.  
Perhaps the focus on communion themes in the positioning efforts of the women in this 
study is salient here? In the females, positive I-positions were linked to the face as the focus 
for social interaction. For example, many women in the sample described their eyes as 
embodying strength and honesty in the context of esteem concerns and relationship conflicts. 
The males in the sample positioned themselves very differently in embodied terms. As we 
have seen, they construed esteem through their torsos. Thus, when the pattern of embodied 
disengagement between the sexes is coupled with the more communion-oriented focus on 
conflict in the women, compared to the more individual (agentic) concerns of the men, a 
picture emerges of female sociality with positive I-positions embodied in the face, and male 
physicality, with positive I-positions embodied in the torso. Embodied positioning in men and 
women, therefore, is a source of important differences not just because of female 
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objectification (social positioning), but because the dialogical self is embodied differently by 
men and women (reflexive positioning). Problems emerge, then, because males and females 
use quite different modes of embodying self-expression.  
So, do men and women have trouble seeing eye to eye, as Gray (2008) asserts in her 
joke? The present analysis seems to confirm that a problem exists! Perhaps differences in 
embodying the self across the sexes are a natural concomitant of differences in the way 
conflict is construed by men and women. Should we accept then the canonical narrative of 
male lust and so blame the man for his wandering gaze? – the message behind Gray’s joke. It 
is possible that males just can’t help it; it being a curious outgrowth and consequence of the 
way men position themselves in embodied terms.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
With reference finally to the development of positioning theory more generally, I have 
tried to illustrate how the approach taken here has the potential to provide a generative 
framework for studying the dialogical self in its social and cultural context. A principle 
purpose here was to demonstrate how the approach can account for the complexity of the 
self’s constitution, both in individual-reflexive and social terms. The model of positioning 
used here assumes that both agentic/reflexive and socially constituted influences operate 
together in the formation of psychic conflict. In terms of dialogical self theory, it is 
noteworthy that the kinds of sex differences illustrated here may only become visible by 
conceptualising the self as a multiplicity of conflicting positions. Using this strategy, a picture 
of underlying tensions in the organisation of the self becomes apparent, and these tensions 
can be interpreted for specific individuals or for groups, in harness with positioning theory.  
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Chapter 11 
 
 
 
DIALOGICALITY AND THE (DE)SECURITISATION OF 
SELF: GLOBALISATION, MIGRATION AND 
MULTICULTURAL POLITICS 
 
 
Catarina Kinnvall and Sarah Scuzzarello 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea that multiculturalism is in crisis is a predominant feature of the 21st century. In 
the aftermath of the terrorist attacks in New York, Madrid, and London this idea has become 
a pronounced aspect of public debate across Western Europe. Glazer’s optimistic statement 
that “We’re All Multiculturalists Now!” (1997, book title) seems to have lost its resonance 
among both politicians and the public at large. A commonly shared narrative of crisis has 
emerged among the public and policy makers who perceive previous policies, which 
emphasised difference over communality and cultural particularity over social cohesion, as a 
kind of failed experimentation.  
Several academic studies have demonstrated a ‘retreat’ of multiculturalism in Europe and 
their replacement by policies of civic integration (Joppke, 2004). By way of example, several 
countries traditionally labelled ‘multicultural’ (e.g., Britain, Sweden, and the Netherlands) 
have introduced citizenship rituals, while others have made language and national culture 
tests a precondition for naturalisation (e.g., Britain and Denmark). Furthermore, politicians 
and policy-makers increasingly use a rhetoric which emphasises the need to develop a sense 
of belonging and identity (Home Office, 2002). A number of studies have argued that 
migration is increasingly being presented as a danger to the public order and a threat to 
European society. Drawing upon critical security studies, Weaver et al. (1993) argue, for 
instance, that migration has increasingly become constructed as a threat to cultural, economic 
but also physical security (see also den Boer, 1995; Huysmans, 1995, 2000; Kinnvall, 2004; 
Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010)
1
.  
                                                        
1
 For a critique and a development of this approach, see Boswell (2007). 
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In this context Tariq Modood (2005, 2007), among others, has argued that Muslims in 
Europe have become the main scapegoats of the critics of multiculturalism. Young male 
Muslims are often depicted as increasingly radicalized and urban areas, densely populated by 
Muslims, are often seen as a fertile breeding ground for Islamic fundamentalism. Women and 
the veiling issue in particular, has also become an easy target well beyond France, where the 
debate started in the late 1980s. The veil, in all its shapes and lengths, often stands for the 
most visible illustration of patriarchal, religious oppression of Muslim women
2
. In this 
context several European countries have decided to ban (or attempted to do so) the use of 
headscarves in the public domain. Sceptical voices concerning the possibilities to live in a 
multicultural, non-antagonistic society have also been augmented among minorities. Research 
shows that events like rallies in support of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 could 
be the expression of sceptical voices among minority groups regarding the possibilities of 
living in a multicultural society (Akthar, 2005).  
In this chapter we argue that in an increasingly globalised and culturally diverse world, 
majority and minority communities may perceive migration and increased diversity as threats 
in relation to the survival of the community and the preservation of culture and heritage. They 
are securitised, i.e., presented as an existential threat
3
, thus justifying actions outside the 
common bounds of political procedure (Buzan et al., 1998). These perceived threats are likely 
to lead to ‘monological closures’, to use Bakhtin’s terminology (1979/1986), which refers to 
the attempts made by a single authority to monopolise meaning to the exclusion of all 
competing voices
4
. A range of threats to identity and beliefs prompt communities to seek 
socio-cultural and religious refuge in a series of ‘born again’ adoptions of religious, national, 
ethno-racial, or gendered signifiers (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010). This resort to 
essentialism is what we label the ‘securitisation of subjectivity’ (Kinnvall, 2004, 2006), as 
discussed later. As Akhtar (2005) demonstrates, young Muslims’ increased adherence to 
religion can be explained not only in structural terms (e.g., their economic and social 
exclusion) but also in psychological terms. The “return to religion” is a phenomenon “that 
offers individuals who feel in some ways constrained by their circumstances an alternative 
ideology, a sense of belonging, solidarity and a means of political mobilization” (Akhtar, 
2005, p. 165).  
Yet globalisation and diversity need not only prompt closure and securitisation. The late-
modern world also brings with it an empowering and transformative potential as people have 
the possibility of organising themselves against different kinds of oppression (Nesbitt-
Larking, 2009). The multitude of daily encounters at work, in schools, or through 
associations, for instance, provide several opportunities for challenging one’s mores and 
traditions, for questioning those taken-for-granted narratives about society, its members and 
their “proper” behaviour (i.e., desecuritisation). We argue that the processes of securitisation 
and desecuritisation can be better understood and analyzed by reference to dialogical 
approaches to research in social psychology. In the field of international relations (IR), where 
the concept of ‘securitisation’ was originally developed, there is a tendency to focus on social 
                                                        
2
 For recent works on the veiling issue see, among others Mahmood (2005), Scott (2007), Roy (2007), Joppke 
(2009).  
3
 Here we rely on Anthony Giddens’ (1991) discussion of existential as being concerned with existence itself, the 
external world and human life, the existence of the other, and what self-identity actually is. An existential 
threat is perceived as a threat against all these aspects of being. 
4
 See also Gillespie (2008) for a similar argument. 
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and cognitive relations at the macro level, while devoting less attention to how securitisation 
processes affect people’s lives. Coming from a research tradition in IR, we see a need to 
complement this body of work with analytical tools borrowed from social psychology to 
better understand how macro phenomena, such as the construction of social representations, 
impact on the micro level of individual identification.  
We argue that a dialogical conceptualisation of the self as proposed by, among others, 
Hermans and associates (1992) contributes significantly to the understanding of the dynamics 
of identity construction in the context of globalised and diverse societies. We identify two 
reasons for this. First, it provides a perspective on the self that enables researchers to better 
understand the mechanisms that may lead to monological closures and the securitisation of 
subjectivity. At the same time, a dialogical understanding of the self challenges the practices 
and discourses which tend to portray identity as static and reified. Second, a dialogical 
approach provides a number of critical theoretical and analytical tools for challenging the 
consequences of monological closures. As Hermans and Dimaggio emphasize “one of the 
central features of dialogical relationships is that they have the potential of innovating the 
self” (2007, p. 53). In the context of globalisation and increased migration flows a person 
could develop new personal stories which create new affiliations and forms of identification 
with the ‘other’. In this way she could change her antagonistic psychological orientations 
towards the ‘other’ and thus promote social courage, pro-social behaviour, tolerance and care 
in a global world. 
We proceed by presenting the work on dialogical self (Hermans et al., 1992; Hermans, 
2001; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007) and clarify the theoretical linkages between this body of 
literature and critical security studies as developed in IR (Buzan et al., 1998). Second, in 
addressing some of the shortcomings of dialogical self theory we demonstrate how 
positioning theories (Harré & van Langenhove, 1991) can strengthen a conception of 
dialogical self. Here we draw upon Marková’s (2003a; 2003b; 2006) concept of dialogicality, 
i.e., “the capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and communicate about social 
realities in terms of the ‘Alter’” (i.e., of otherness) (2003b, p. 249) as well as Raggatt’s 
understanding of positioning (2007; 2010; this volume) and argue that both examine personal 
and social constructions of self and that they therefore force us to think of self and identity in 
terms of both change and continuity. Finally, we present some of the implications of 
dialogicality, positioning and the (de)securitisation of subjectivity for ethics and politics in 
the context of globalisation and increased migration flows. In conclusion, we argue in favour 
of a dialogically constituted critical self that is capable distancing itself from other symbolic 
orders. This can lead to a heightened degree of reflexivity. 
 
 
DIALOGICAL SELF, POSITIONING AND GLOBALISATION 
 
The Russian literary theorist and critic Mikhail Bakhtin (1979/1986; 1994) stressed that 
the characters in Dostoevsky’s works were created in a dialogue of intersecting voices. 
Bakhtin called this sort of novel polyphonic. The concept of polyphony has implications for 
how the self is re-conceptualized in terms of continuous interpersonal and intrapersonal 
dialogues and has recently inspired social psychologists and personality psychologists. One of 
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the strands of literature inspired by a Bakhtinian understanding of the self as polyphonic is 
dialogical self theory (Hermans et al. 1992; Hermans, 2001; Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007).  
Hermans and colleagues define the dialogical self as “a dynamic of multiplicity of 
relatively autonomous I-positions in an imaginal landscape” (1992, p. 28). The self is 
constituted by a polyphony of voices in constant dialogue with each other and with the outer 
world. One voice is emphasized over others in accordance with changes in time and space. 
These voices are not necessarily harmonious, but can rather express different and even 
opposed narratives about the self (Hermans et al., 1992; Hermans, 2001)
5
. The metaphor of 
voices within the self is commonly translated in terms of “a dynamic multiplicity of 
positions” (Hermans, 2001, p. 258), in which the individual is involved in an active process of 
positioning depending on the particular situation at hand. Thus conceived, the dialogical self 
is dynamic in that the ‘I’ can occupy different positions depending on the context in which it 
acts. It is ‘social’, not so much in the sense that a self-contained individual enters into social 
interactions with others, but in the sense that the self is constituted by a multiplicity of 
internal and external positions (Hermans, 2001). Internal positions refer to those conceived of 
as parts of one’s self (e.g., I as a mother), while external positions are used to describe people 
and objects that are part of the external environment and relevant from the perspective of one 
or more of the internal positions (e.g., my child) (Hermans, 2001). These positions interact 
with each other, and also with a third zone, the outside world. Hermans (2001) argues that a 
person is not necessarily aware of all aspects of these positions (e.g., a person may be 
positioned as a migrant despite the fact that he or she may be a citizen in a country and not 
feel like a migrant), but they may become part of their internal and external positions later in 
life (for instance when entering the job market, he or she may be unable to get a job because 
of their particular migrant positioning). The distinction between the ‘outside world’ and 
‘external/internal positions’ is problematic, however, if the relation between them, i.e., the 
dynamics of positioning
6
, is not studied and understood. Taking the work of Hermans and 
colleagues as a case in point, it remains unclear how broader social positions affect the 
development of the self unless we also take seriously the discursive and structural aspects of 
positioning. This is particularly important as we discuss how a dialogical approach can 
actually be helpful for changing the often marginalized positions of migrants in Western 
societies. 
In contrast to dialogical self scholars, Harré and van Langenhove (1991; 1999), in their 
original definition of positioning theory, emphasize the social and discursive aspects of 
positioning at the cost of the personal. Positioning, according to Harré and van Langenhove, 
indicates the relational cluster of generic personal attributes which impinges on the 
possibilities of interpersonal, intergroup and even intrapersonal action. Positioning takes place 
within a moral order as people are positioned in various ways; dominant or submissive, 
dependent or independent, masculine or feminine, and so on. Such dichotomies reflect current 
power relationships and have consequences for how others are conceived. Outsiders 
                                                        
5
 Valsiner (2005) argues that Hermans’ and associates’ conception of different I-positions as alternating between 
internal and external positions, is an implementation of George Herbert Mead’s original view of the ongoing 
relation between I and ME. This line of thinking is not new, he argues. Rather, psychological theorising has 
long been concerned with counter-positioning, such as: ego and non-ego, narrative and counter-narrative, 
voice and non-voice, etc. 
6
 Positioning was originally defined by Harré and van Langenhove as “the discursive construction of personal 
stories that make a person’s actions intelligible and relatively determinate as social acts and within which the 
members of the conversation have specific locations” (1992, p. 395). 
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(immigrants, minorities, strangers) are commonly perceived as a homogenous category of 
others even when being insiders to a social, economic and political system. However, the 
level of ‘foreignhood’, or ‘strangeness’, given to the other is contextual. It is dependent upon 
the type of situation in which the other is observed as well as the hierarchical position of the 
other (Oommen, 1994). 
This line of reasoning can be illustrated by looking at the situation in Italy, while 
recognizing that these developments are not limited to Italy alone. Since the early 1990s, 
Italian immigration policies have defined migrants as extracomunitari (extra-
communitarians), which denotes their origins outside the European Community, now the 
European Union. In public discourse, the term also positions them in a permanent status of 
non-belonging to the Italian nation and it underlines not only an ethno-cultural distance, but 
also a material one. The extracomunitario is a person who has emigrated because she/he is 
poor (Schmidt, 2004; Scuzzarello, 2010). Interestingly, while the definition of migrants as 
extracomunitari is unavoidably homogenizing, the national groups that have been included in 
this definition by the media and the public have varied depending on a range of socio-political 
processes that have affected the country. In the 1990s, when Italy was experiencing 
significant migration flows from Albania, people coming from that part of the world were not 
positioned mainly as extracomunitari, but rather as Albanesi. This image depicted Albanian 
migrants as particularly prone to criminality and violence (Mai, 2002). Since the increased 
migration flows from Eastern Europe during the early 2000s, the public’s attention has turned 
away from Albanians, who are now usually labelled extracomunitari. Romanians have instead 
become the new target of public attention and have recently been positioned by the media and 
in the political debates as violent and criminals
7
. 
The psychological impact of such positioning on migrants may be difficult to grasp, 
however, unless we move towards a more complex approach to positioning. Raggatt (2007), 
in criticizing Harré’s and Langenhove’s definition of positioning for prioritizing the 
discursive aspects of positioning at the cost of the personal, suggests that the relation between 
the social and the personal cannot be conceived of as independent processes: “the self 
embodies the personal and the social simultaneously, just as it also embodies change and 
permanence” (Raggatt, 2007, p. 359). Positioning, he argues, captures the dynamics 
(movement) in polyphonic conceptions of the self from both a personal-dynamic perspective 
and a social-discursive perspective. The classification he suggests is based on three 
distinctions: (1) indicating medium or mode of expression of positioning 
(narrative/discursive, performative/expressive and embodied), (2) personal positioning 
identifying conflict within a person, and (3) social positioning involving social and cultural 
constructions (conversational/discursive, institutional roles/rituals, political/hierarchical). The 
advantage of Raggatt’s classification, which is explored further in the concluding section of 
this chapter, lies in its focus on both personal and social constructions of self which implies 
that self and identity are understood in terms of both change and continuity. In this sense, as 
Raggatt points out, self is embodied and biological as well as social and cultural and must, as 
a consequence, be examined in both senses to understand of it.  
                                                        
7
 This depiction of Romanians has become increasingly vicious following the sexual assault and murder of an 
Italian woman in Rome by a Romanian man at the end of October 2007 and a series of other assaults and 
crimes allegedly conducted by Romanians (La Repubblica 31 October, 2007)  
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The conceptualisation of the self presented thus far, i.e., as constituted by a dynamic 
multiplicity of interrelated personal and social positions, highlights the processual and 
relational character of the processes of self and collective identity formations. Our examples 
of young Muslims in Western Europe can illustrate this further. The fact that Islam, in 
response to legacies of colonialisation, modernity, globalisation and current discourses on 
terror, has become increasingly politicized and is depicted by some members of the majority 
societies as a security threat, has sharpened identity issues among many young Muslims. This 
entails that they may experience the need to constantly negotiate with the rest of the society 
what it means to be a Muslim. As young Muslims inhabiting societies where Islam is 
continuously being discussed and questioned, not least in media, they see themselves as being 
stereotypically defined in religious terms. Despite the fact that these young European 
Muslims are often legal citizens of the societies in which they reside, they find themselves 
under strong pressures to take a stand in the perceived conflict between various notions of 
European secularism and Islamic religion (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010). 
In an increasingly globalised world, individuals become subject to meetings with other 
forms of identifications expressed in ethnic, cultural and religious terms. Dialogical self 
theory, with its emphasis on dialogues, turns the researcher’s attention to the dynamics of 
positioning among voices, and enables us to understand the self as processual, multiple and 
relational. In fact, the interactions between social and personal positions and the meetings 
with actual others affect one’s sense of the self. The other “questions, challenges and changes 
existing positions in the self, and is able to introduce new ones” (Hermans, 2001, p. 255, 
emphasis added). To conceive of the dialogical self as being open to an ambiguous other and 
in flux toward a future that is largely unknown therefore leaves space for creativity and 
innovation. At the same time, Hermans and Dimaggio (2007) contend that there are both 
biological and social limits to this intrinsic openness and fluidity. People are apparently in 
need of an environment stable enough to feel at home and to experience a feeling of security 
and safety in a rapidly changing world. This is similar to Valsiner’s (2003) discussion of 
‘enabling constraints’ in response to macro-level cultural restrictions. Such ’constraints’ 
consist of a set of semiotic mediators to cope with bounded indeterminacy which allow the 
person to transcend the here-and-now setting through intra-psychological distancing. 
Increasing interconnections between cultural groups may pose pressures on the dialogical 
capacity of the self to integrate an increasing number of voices. As a result, negative feelings 
of uncertainty caused by growing complexity, ambiguity, deficit knowledge and 
unpredictability could be released and evoke defensive strategies such as the “monological 
domination by only one voice (e.g., nationalism, fundamentalism, sexism, or terrorism)” 
(Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007, p. 50). In the following two sections we address first the issue 
of closure and uncertainty by linking it to theories of securitisation (Buzan et al., 1998). 
Second, drawing from Ivana Marková’s understanding of dialogue and dialogicality (2003a, 
2003b), we explore the opportunities for change in psychological orientations of self and 
other.  
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DIALOGICAL SELF AND DESECURITISATION 
 
We agree with Hermans and Dimaggio (2007) as far as the problematic aspects and 
effects of globalisation are concerned, i.e., feelings of uncertainty and the increased risk for 
monological closure. However, their attempt to bring together neurobiological and socio-
emotional factors to explain monological closure (2007) could benefit from further 
clarification and from the insights of discursive and narrative approaches to security, thus 
addressing the structural and psychological mechanisms that lead to monologue. Proceeding 
from work in international relations (Buzan et al., 1998), we understand ‘security’ as being 
about survival (of the state, the community, the culture, and/or the sense of self). It is a 
discursive move that takes politics beyond the established rules of the game and frames the 
issue either as a special kind of politics or as above politics. Thus ‘securitisation’ refers to the 
politicization of certain phenomena that enables the use of extraordinary means in the name 
of security. Securitisation studies aims to understand “who securitizes, on what issues 
(threats), for whom (referent object), why, with what results, and not least, under what 
conditions” (Buzan et al., 1998, p. 32). It can therefore be interpreted as the process of 
labelling a particular referent object (e.g., migration or cultural and religious change) as an 
existential threat, which implies that an individual’s or a collective’s sense of the self is 
perceived as threatened (Buzan el al., 1998)
8
. Securitisation is important for conceptualizing 
the dynamics of positioning in terms of reducing the heterogeneity of positions and silencing 
other personal and social positions. Indeed, a process of innovation of the individual and 
collective self that is able to move away from confrontational self-other relations can be 
promoted only when people are made aware of the dynamics resulting in closure and 
antagonism and when the discursive and material structures change to become inclusive 
rather than exclusive. This latter process is referred to as desecuritisation, i.e., the shifting of 
issues out of emergency mode into an area of accommodation and dialogical understanding 
that reduce feelings of insecurity. 
Hermans and Dimaggio (2007) argue that the uncertainties and instabilities caused by 
increased globalisation trigger individuals’ desire for stability and satisfaction of basic 
biological needs. When these needs for a stable enough environment are threatened, the 
authors argue, people tend to respond with anxiety, hate and anger. The explanations they 
provide for increased anxiety in response to threatened universal biological needs are both 
biological and emotional. Their conclusion is worth mentioning at length. 
 
“Evolutionary-based motives that grant survival and fitness and the need for safety, 
protection, and stability lead to establishing a set of positions that create a split between in-
group and out-group in the service of confirming the identities of individuals and groups. The 
neurologically based tendency to return to ordinary and familiar positions […] have the 
advantage that people can use an economical set of stereotypical or abbreviated dialogues 
(Lyra, 1999), but they do not permit the individual to move easily beyond the constraints of 
traditional or familiar interactions. The socially based emotion rules, on the other hand, help 
individuals and groups to interact in ways that are shared and appreciated by the community 
                                                        
8
 Not everything can become a security issue. Securitisation theory presents a list of three necessary steps - the 
completion of which guarantees a successful securitisation. These are: (1) identification of existential threats; 
(2) emergency action; and (3) effects on inter-unit relations by breaking free of rules (Buzan et al. 1998, p. 6). 
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to which they belong, but they restrict the range of positions and limit the openness of 
dialogical relationships with people outside the community.” (2007, p. 47-48) 
 
We find their conclusion problematic in two ways. First, the biological explanation they 
provide whereby a specific part of the brain “favors emotionally based monological 
responses” (2007, p. 44), reduces closures and their effects (e.g., stereotypes, exclusion, 
devaluation) to biological deficiencies rather than knowledge structures that contain beliefs 
and expectations about social groups. Second, while we are not questioning the existence of 
basic human needs (see Winnicot, 1965; Staub, 2003), we argue that Hermans and Dimaggio 
overlook the interaction between the social and the personal, focusing mainly on the latter. 
Their attention to emotions as the main expressions of the social and the societal is certainly 
interesting. However, it is insufficient to explain the social mechanisms that lead to 
monological closures in some cases, while not in others, and to the perception of certain 
needs as being more important than others, and therefore more important to protect if 
threatened. What, in other words, is the role of social norms in changing the significance of 
those positions in the self that are constructed as “exclusively important” (Hermans & 
Dimaggio, 2007, p. 43)? And how can “emotion rules” (p. 47), understood as the collective 
and individual ethic and morality, be changed to become more inclusive and open to other 
groups and individuals? While the psychological mechanisms underlying a need for stability 
can be seen as essential to human beings, their focus on evolutionary-based motives and 
personal positions at the expense of a contextual interrogation of what is needed to feel 
secure, weaken their general conclusions. As a result we prefer to interpret threatened needs 
and the search for solutions, not only as an individual process, but also as an outcome of 
social processes. In this way we emphasise the dialogical relation between the social and the 
personal, as discussed previously in the chapter. In particular, we maintain that the social 
process of presenting an issue as a threat to one’s sense of the individual and/or collective 
self, i.e., securitising it, affects the personal positioning of an individual. 
Securitisation theory was originally formulated within international relations theory, as 
noted above (see Buzan et al., 1998). Of importance is how security issues are produced by 
actors who interpret a problem as an existential threat and therefore claim the right to use 
extraordinary measures to defend (and defeat) that problem. The perspective entails a shift 
from regarding security, and the lack thereof, as a fact, to see it as the outcome of a specific 
speech act, i.e., the process of securitisation (Waever, 1995). As Sheehan (2005) has noted:  
 
“European politicians in the early 1990s allowed migration to come to be seen as an issue that 
could threaten domestic social and political cohesion, and subsequent political developments 
such as the Gulf wars and Al-Qaida terrorist attacks made it comparatively easy to manipulate 
sentiments and securitize the migration issue in a negative manner.” (p. 95) 
 
This conceptualisation of security as an outcome of a speech act is not only a political 
statement. Scholars should understand securitisation as having political as well as ontological 
and emotional implications in order to understand that the definition of a security issue is not 
just a fact, but also a discursive construction that taps on people’s feelings (Kinnvall, 2004).  
Securitising subjectivity may be manifested in forms of totalistic modes of reasoning, 
black and white thinking, religious or secular fundamentalism, and other manifestations of 
psychic rigidity, such as intolerance of ambiguity, or a rejection of the artistic or the 
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expressive. Securitising subjectivity thus secures coherence in a world that is otherwise 
fragmented and threatening. Familiar symbols and tropes, such as those of nation, gender, and 
religion, are used to anchor the self, often through a retreat to a mythical past. In the process, 
identity becomes essentialised as meaning is appropriated in the establishment of a privileged 
interpretation of certain discourses and texts, preventing further explorations of meaning. This 
process is likely to take place regardless of the multiple and instable character of subjectivity 
(Giddens, 1991; Bauman, 2001; Kinnvall, 2004, 2006; Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010). 
This can be illustrated by reference to multicultural Western European societies. As local 
cultures are challenged and changed as a result of globalisation, some people find themselves 
adrift: at home neither in the local context nor in the global situation. As vividly expressed by 
Janusz Bakrawi in an interview shown in the documentary; Mit Danmark (“My Denmark”, 
Final Cut Film Production, DR 1, February 4, 2007): 
 
“I was born in Denmark, here in Virum. […]. My mother is Polish and my father Palestinian. 
As a child and a teenager I never saw myself as being different. I was Danish and my friends 
were called Mikael and Jakob. Slowly I discovered however, that people saw something 
different. A stranger, an immigrant – somebody allowed visiting. The only immigrants I had 
known were my mother and father. I didn’t even know that they were immigrants. It is strange 
to discover that you are suddenly a guest.” 
 
During a walk through the city Bakrawi talks about the anger and frustration of not 
belonging. He talks about how he has tried to fit in; tried to be a “real” Arab, tried to laugh 
with the Danes when they made jokes about immigrants, but all this just made him angrier. In 
response he finds himself asking questions about his identity: Who am I? How do I define 
myself? Where do I belong? Am I an Arab, a Pole or Danish? Who do you think I am?  
In response to such questions, young (first or second-generation) migrants may search for 
alternative answers in mythologized traditions, fundamentalist religions or far-away 
nationalisms (Brubaker, 2002; Vertovec 2000). These answers are often provided by so-called 
hegemonic traditionalists (Hansson & Kinnvall, 2004), who tend to construct a range of 
essentialist readings of past, present, and future in which Islamic authority is made prominent. 
For instance, in 2006 nearly 30 British Islamic groups, including the Muslim Council of 
Britain which is one of the largest Muslim organizations in the country, issued a statement on 
the use of the veil by Muslim women. The statement urged:  
 
“All members of the Muslim community to show solidarity against criticising the veil or any 
other Islamic practice as this might prove to be a stepping-stone towards further restrictions. 
Today the veil, tomorrow it could be the beard, jilbab and thereafter the head-scarf! Such a 
strategy, unfortunately, has been widely used by many European countries.” 
 
It called on the “Muslim community” [sic!] to “remain united regardless of its differences 
and opinions about the veil” because: 
 
“The unexpected and ruthless reaction of the media over the past few weeks on this issue 
gives an indication that there is a political agenda behind this campaign. […] This becomes 
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more apparent when observing the already tense climate facing Muslims, which is 
contributing towards creating hostility in the wider society against the Muslim community
9
.” 
 
These quotes construct a particular notion of crisis, by depicting Muslims as ruthlessly 
and disrespectfully treated by segments of the majority society. Statements like these, even if 
not shared by the vast majority of Muslims, are likely to resonate with feelings of structural 
exclusion and psychological vulnerability. Hence, they may trigger the development of what 
Jovchelovitch (2008) calls ‘non-dialogical encounters’, i.e., encounters characterized by the 
lack of mutual recognition and by the attempt to impose one system of meaning and 
knowledge to the least powerful group. They may thus affect some young Muslims in their 
search for an embracing identity.  
These young Muslims’ condition is clearly existential in a dialogical sense, related to 
their youth, context and the way they are perceived by parts of the majority society – 
structurally as well as psychologically. In the words of Ivana Marková (2003a), their 
identities are ‘co-authored’ by the other, i.e., the society in which they live and the people 
whom they meet. This implies that the solution to their situation cannot be focused on these 
young people alone, but must involve the majority society as well, including the norms and 
values that inform and shape it. Here the advantages of adopting a dialogical approach which 
incorporates the insights of securitisation theory in understanding monological closures are 
evident. On the one hand this approach acknowledges the deeply rooted need for safety and 
stability in life circumstances, strongly emphasised by object relation theorists (e.g., 
Winnicott, 1965; 1975). On the other hand it provides the analytical tools for understanding 
the contextual and socially constructed character of those phenomena that may threaten one’s 
sense of safety and stability. Referring to the example above, this approach provides scholars 
with the theoretical tools for understanding young Muslims’ search for a stable and “true” 
sense of the self. At the same time it emphasizes the importance of investigating how young 
Muslims are positioned as security threats by parts of the majority society as well as by 
hegemonic traditionalists who use monological closure to depict the West as a threat to 
Muslims. When the dialogue between personal and social positions, as well as between 
imposed and adopted ones is well understood, scholars will be able to suggest ways to 
introduce changes in psychological orientations that challenge antagonistic relations.  
 
 
DIALOGICALITY AND CHANGE IN PSYCHOLOGICAL ORIENTATIONS 
 
So far we have argued that a dialogical understanding of the self coupled with an 
approach that sees threats as socially constructed, thus affecting individuals’ personal sense of 
security, provide interesting insights for understanding the emergence of “monological 
domination by only one voice” (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007, p. 50) in increasingly 
globalised and diverse societies. In this section we want to argue for a second important 
advantage in adopting a dialogical understanding of the self. A direct consequence deriving 
from a dialogical approach is that it conceives of the self in non-static terms and is therefore 
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 The quotes come from the statement “Important advice to the Muslim community in light of the debate over the 
veil”. Issued on October 15, 2006. Available at http://www.islam21c.com/index.php?option=com_ 
content&task=view&id=18282&Itemid=18 . Accessed on March 14, 2010. 
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able to account for change (Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007). This does not mean that the self is 
constantly in flux because individuals tend to search for a sense of continuity of their 
identities. Rather, it entails a challenge to monological and antagonistic group relations and 
non-dialogical encounters (Jovchelovitch, 2008) as it provides the opportunity for the 
development of a transformative multicultural theory.  
In Marková’s interpretation (e.g., 2003b), dialogue is not only important at the 
intrapersonal level (between different I positions), but also at the interpersonal one – between 
the self and the other, the ‘Ego’ and the ‘Alter’. In Marková’s work, dialogicality, i.e., the 
capacity of the human mind to conceive, create and communicate about social realities 
(2003b), sets the foundations for a conception of ontology which sees the self and the other 
not only as interrelated but as equally engaged in an interdependent relation (Marková, 2006). 
This means that the “dialogicality of the Ego-Alter is of ontological nature. In and through 
communication the Ego-Alter intersubjectively co-constitutes one another: one does not exist 
without the other” (Marková, 2006, p. 126). A dialogical understanding of self-other relations 
is important in the context of multiculturalism as it challenges the assumptions that group 
relations are only antagonistic in nature (self versus other). The other, be it an individual or a 
collective, is fundamental to the self’s identity and vice-versa. The self has to struggle and 
come to terms with the strangeness of the other not by fusing him or herself with the other but 
by recognizing the strangeness of the other (Marková, 2003a). Total consensus is impossible 
to achieve in the dialogue between self and other (Marková, 2003a). Given the impossibility 
of reaching total consensus, the dialogical principle cannot be reduced to intersubjectivity, 
reciprocity and mutuality, but must be open to difference and conflict that allow for 
innovation and creativity. Hence, if we accept that the dialogical relation is an existential 
relation then, according to Marková, our social psychological questions will be different than 
those asked in non-dialogical approaches. They should not involve individuals and groups as 
separate entities. Instead, they should involve varieties of Ego-Alter relations which cannot be 
anything but communicative (Markova 2003; for an extended discussion see Kinnvall & 
Lindén, in press). Thus, when investigating minorities, for example, they should be viewed as 
mutually interdependent with majorities. The interdependence of Ego-Alter thus constitutes a 
point of departure in social inquiry.  
What are the practical implications of a dialogical understanding of self-other relations in 
the context of multiculturalism? By what means can we attempt to innovate the self in order 
to desecuritise subjectivity and transform antagonistic relationships between groups to 
relationships that acknowledge the dialogicality of the Ego-Alter? Hermans and Dimaggio 
suggest that the most straightforward way in which the self can be innovated is when new 
forms of identification and new positions (I as a mother; I as a worker; I as a Muslim; I as a 
Briton) are introduced “that lead to the reorganization of the repertoire in such a way that the 
self becomes more adaptive and flexible in a variety of circumstances” (2007, p. 53). The 
concept of ‘transformative dialogue’ (Gergen et al., 2001; McNamee & Gergen, 1999) is 
useful to understand this.  
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TRANSFORMATIVE DIALOGUE IN A MULTICULTURAL CONTEXT 
 
The aim of transformative dialogue is to develop dialogues with members of allegedly 
antagonistic groups (e.g., pro-life activists with supporters of abortion rights; members of the 
majority society with migrants). Some may want to draw parallels to the idea of intercultural 
dialogue introduced by several multicultural theorists (e.g., Taylor, 1994; Parekh, 2000). 
While we agree on the importance of dialogue for the development of diverse societies, we 
read intercultural dialogue to be based on certain antagonisms between two parties where one 
party disapproves of the other’s practices10. As a result, intercultural dialogue tends to 
construct the other as an object (sometimes even an object of contempt) and is therefore likely 
to lead to alienation. Indeed if intercultural dialogue is not successful, “incomprehension, 
intransigence, irreconcilable differences” (Parekh, 2000, p. 272), will arise. 
In contrast, transformative dialogue emerges when the speaker and the respondent 
recognize the perspective of the other and, further, when they are able and willing to revise 
and change their initial standpoints by taking the preceding utterances of the other into 
account (Gergen et al., 2001; Jovchelovitch, 2008; Scuzzarello, 2010). Gergen et al. (2001) 
argue that in engaging in a transformative dialogue with others, and by acknowledging our 
relatedness to them, we are not necessarily aiming at consensus. Rather, we aim at opening up 
the possibility for the development of new forms of self and collective identification. Given 
the impossibility of total consensus, as Marková suggests, it is therefore necessary for all 
concerned – minorities as well as majorities – to avoid a reduction of dialogical principle to 
intersubjectivity, reciprocity and mutuality and, instead, strive to secure openness to 
difference and conflict that allows for innovation and creativity (see also Jovchelovitch, 
2008).  
This is different from Parekh’s notion of intercultural dialogue which does not 
necessarily aim at developing a new sense of community and loyalty. In contrast, a 
transformative dialogue leads to an understanding of what it means to belong to a community 
and therefore goes beyond a formal contract between the state and its citizens. This is 
important for the establishment of a multicultural society devoid of tension and conflict, as a 
transformative dialogue recognises the emotional bonds embedded in the construction of a 
citizen. Thus, in the context of multicultural citizenship debates, we would argue that while it 
is important to guarantee minorities’ equal access to rights, a dialogue should be established 
between the recipient society and minority communities in order to develop psychological 
and emotional bonds that can provide a deeper meaning to societal membership. In this way, 
minority communities can be provided with the tools for experiencing a stronger commitment 
and responsibility to their country of settlement. 
How can a transformative dialogue be achieved? This type of dialogue requires that we 
are attentive to the viewpoints of others and to their needs. This means that in the course of 
the dialogue ample opportunity is given to self-expression, that each part can make its voice 
heard (Gergen et al., 2001). Transformative dialogue also requires that we are responsive to 
the other part in the dialogue. This does not mean that we should try to put ourselves in the 
situation of the other. As Young (1997) points out this would obscure the social positions of 
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 Intercultural dialogue proceeds in three stages (Parekh 2000). The minority defends the practice in question in 
terms of its cultural authority; its community-sustaining role; and by looking for moral similarities in the 
majority society’s culture. 
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the parties, thus neglecting the different positions in the distributions of power. Instead we 
should retain an asymmetrical understanding of reciprocity through a communicative 
interaction that acknowledges the specificity of positions of those involved and their unique 
life histories and psychological constitution.  
Scuzzarello (2008), for instance, notes that projects aimed at integration (e.g., Britain or 
Sweden) or assimilation (e.g., France or Denmark) of immigrants into the host society often 
focus on the need to help these immigrants out of oppressive traditions. Many people engaged 
in these policies are clearly doing this out of a sense of moral responsibility. However, the 
wish to help immigrants to integrate into the recipient society is related to conceptions of 
what is held to be morally right and normal to do. Hence despite good intentions, the 
normative boundaries of the majority are often reproduced and strengthened in relation to 
representations of the other as socially less apt. The way immigrants are perceived and dealt 
with becomes, in other words, a matter of performing within the parameters of cultural and 
structural conditions. Integration policies are not created in a vacuum but are conceptualized, 
implicitly or explicitly, through a relationship with those to whom they are directed: the 
immigrants. Similarly, cultural closing down or the securitisation of subjectivity among many 
migrants and members of minority populations is performed in relation to such policies as 
well as in relation to the social world which they have left behind and now wish to recreate. 
A transformative dialogue intends to move away from such one-dimensional strategies. 
Hence, to engage in a transformative dialogue entails that both parties manage to move 
beyond the rhetoric of group blame and begin to assume the responsibility for each other’s 
identified needs and claims. For instance, if two cultural groups were to engage in a 
transformative dialogue, they would try to understand what has caused the other group’s 
defensive position rather than blaming one another for destroying cultures and traditions as 
blame only deepens antagonisms. In line with transformative dialogue, Hermans and 
Dimaggio (2007) demonstrate that in clinical experimental studies, communication with real 
others and engagement with other people’s narratives supply means for overcoming the fears 
and uncertainties of contemporary Western societies. Although important as a first step, one 
should note that the presupposition that greater knowledge of the other is enough to prevent 
discrimination, conflict or violent acts, is not entirely consistent with empirical research 
(Todorov, 1982; Kinnvall, 2006). Rather than being a reality, greater knowledge, mutual 
respect and tolerance often remain moral ideals. Instead the contextual relationship between 
groups that are perceived as different from each other is frequently characterised by prejudice, 
xenophobia, and ethnocentrism.  
Hence, looking at the reality of many communities in Europe, majority and minority 
societies tend to live parallel lives. Real others are not always easily accessible. This is 
characteristic for many major cities in Europe. Birmingham in the UK, for instance, has long 
been characterized by strong urban segregation. Areas such as Handsworth, Soho and 
Sparkbrook have a residential concentration of black and minority ethnic communities of 
more than 66 percent with a strong domination of one or a few ethnic groups in each 
neighbourhood (Cangiano, 2007). Similar patterns of urban segregation along ethnic lines can 
be found across Europe. Many of the areas densely populated by migrant minorities are also 
affected by high levels of social deprivation and low educational levels. Such areas often 
constitute zones of exclusion, heavily policed and frequently characterized by violence as a 
way of ruling by provocation. As most members of the majority society never visit these 
areas, they are indeed alien communities (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010). Thus, instead 
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of being based on real encounters, people’s fears are often dominated by rumours, media 
images, and meta-narratives dividing worlds into neat essentialised categories. How can these 
images and narratives be countered through the use of real or imaginary others?  
Gergen’s work does not provide a clear answer to this. Hermans and Dimaggio (2007; 
Hermans, 1996), in contrast, describe a number of clinical experiments conducted by them 
and others that are aimed towards establishing a dialogue with an imagined other. In the 
context of globalisation, they argue, experiments could be run with participants instructed to 
believe that they communicate with people from groups of diverse cultural origins. According 
to Hermans and Dimaggio, such experiments could examine under which conditions 
participants, positioned as members of a particular cultural group, would learn from 
interlocutors positioned as members of another cultural group. A particularly relevant 
question, they maintain, would be whether participants are able or willing to modify their 
selves, taking the strangeness of the interlocutor into account. Hermans and Dimaggio do not 
provide explicit examples of actually conducted experiments with members of particular 
groups but, based on experiments with student populations instructed to take different 
positions (in their case as laymen or experts) which, they argue, influenced their ways of 
behaving and conceptions of the other, this could plausibly be a useful methodology. 
Yet these studies do not deal specifically with how we can overcome stereotypical 
conceptions of other individuals or groups in increasingly multicultural societies. 
Furthermore, Hermans and Dimaggio’s approach has significant problems in addressing real 
structural inequalities. Being able to envision yourself using alternative narratives, real or 
imagined, is only a temporary solution to structural discrimination. At the end of the day 
those who experience themselves as disadvantaged will return to their real material reality 
and structural inclusion or exclusion. As their lives run parallel to that of the majority society, 
it matters little how much they understand others’ life worlds as their life chances are still 
inhibited compared to those who share the majority narrative (Kinnvall & Lindén, in press). If 
a transformative dialogue aims at opening up the possibility for the development of new 
forms of self and collective identification, then it should appeal to a potential sense of 
belonging to the physical space in which individuals live. Local communities may be 
particularly suitable for this scope. They constitute the main sites where immigrants and 
recipient society meet and confront one another; where the questions of how to come to terms 
with diversity are concretely felt; and where people’s stereotypes and fears for each other are 
played out (Penninx & Martiniello, 2004). If local communities can be re-imagined to be 
devoid of segregated spaces, they are plausibly the best places where dialogues with real 
others can be established. Such communities may provide an important basis on which to 
construct a new sense of belonging devoid of negative images and stereotypical 
representations of the other
11
 (Marshall, 1950/1992; Amin, 2006).  
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 It is important to acknowledge however that not all migrants intend to stay in the recipient country for an 
extended period of time. This is particularly true of migrant workers whose patterns of migration are 
significantly different from, for example, asylum seekers and refugees. Indeed, a recent report issued by the 
West Midlands Regional Observatory (2007) shows that the median duration of stay for migrant workers in 
the UK was 17 months. This has important, but often unexplored, consequences for the debates on cohesion 
and belonging.  
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SEARCHING FOR DESECURITISING SOLUTIONS  
TO INSECURITY IN A GLOBAL WORLD 
 
Building on work by Kinnvall and Lindén (in press) and by Kinnvall et al. (2009), we 
envisage a number of ways in which negative images and narratives of real or imaginary 
others can be countered. Changing negative images of the other requires that we address the 
structural and psychological order in which these images are formed. This, in turn, means 
revisiting the construction of this order at all three levels of analysis as suggested by Raggatt 
(2007, 2010, 2011): mode of expression, personal positioning and social positioning. At the 
first level it involves changing the narratives that shape our performance as social and 
embodied actors. This requires a change in strategies at the leadership level to avoid the 
promotion of scapegoating and divisive ideologies. Instead, in order to create a shared 
understanding of future life, leaders must engender a vision of the future and realistic plans 
that are able to include all groups (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003). Changing narratives affect 
personal positioning, as value positions are embodied in countless forms, according to our 
personal histories, the social context and our collections of personal constructs. Reorienting 
moral space in the direction of transformative dialogue and inclusion is thus a fundamental 
task for practitioners involved in changing hostile attitudes and images between majority and 
minority populations.  
This is particularly relevant for the post-migration generation of young Muslims in 
Europe as many of them have become increasingly dissatisfied with low status, social 
exclusion, and discrimination. Both in France and the Netherlands, for instance, Muslim 
youth have been particularly vocal in demanding broader public support for their new-found 
Muslim demands. In the Netherlands, as in other European countries, many Moroccan and 
Turkish youth living segregated lives do not feel empowered to affect the Dutch society and 
thus feel inhibited from developing a Dutch identity. The relatively low economic status of 
many Moroccan and Turkish youth has further contributed to their search for secure religious 
identities (Kinnvall & Nesbitt-Larking, 2010)
12
. However, it is important to stress that 
Moroccan youth has also played an important role in countering the current polarization in 
societal climate by engaging in activities that promote dialogue. As a result of the need for 
young Muslims to respond to hostility or prejudice at school or at work, Islamic youth 
organizations have initiated public discussion meetings (e.g. the foundation “Ben je bang voor 
mij?” [are you afraid of me?]), in order to raise awareness of Islam and the positions of 
Muslim youth (ter Val, 2005).  
Addressing change in narratives and structural positioning is not enough, however; we 
also need to take structural change into account. Creating narrative change in moral 
conceptions of self and others thus requires that structural change is initiated, such as changes 
in the economic situation of a particular group. As both Ferguson (2009) and Lowe, Muldoon 
and Schmid (2009) show in the case of Northern Ireland, greater economic opportunities and 
the greater material well-being of the Catholic minority has contributed to the possibilities of 
peace. Improving the life of less-privileged groups in society, as well as reducing inequalities, 
is thus a critical, albeit practically complex, aspect of reducing conflict. However, changes in 
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 Young Muslims throughout Europe experience a higher level of unemployment than other groups (Pêdziwiatr, 
2007). 
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structural positioning must occur at all three dimensions outlined by Raggatt: the 
conversational/discursive form, which involves the micro encounters of daily life, whether at 
work, in the home or in the street; the positioning in terms of institutional roles involving 
prevailing stereotypes, such as gender roles, parental roles, age roles, class behaviour etc., and 
the positioning arising from the effects of power in various social and political hierarchies. 
This is obviously difficult in practice as such changes involve both structural mechanisms 
(legal and institutional changes) and psychological reorientations (changes in beliefs, 
perceptions and values). However, some steps in this direction can be suggested. 
Political programs need to be designed that address all these dimensions. Education is 
crucial in this regard, as it involves fostering an understanding of the roots of structural, 
psychological and physical violence among both youth and adults (Staub & Bar-Tal, 2003). It 
is also dialogical as it requires participation of all involved (majorities, minorities, 
perpetrator, victims, and bystanders) in order to promote positive attitudes toward people in 
general and towards other groups in society (migrants, strangers, enemies). Organized in such 
a way, these programs embrace a dialogical understanding of self-other relations, as discussed 
by Ivana Marková (2003a; 2003b). Both the ‘Ego’ and the ‘Alter’ must be aware of the 
importance of the other part in ‘co-authoring’ life.  
In conclusion, a dialogical approach emphasizes the need to understand that we are not 
autonomous, independent individuals (as often presumed in liberal accounts), but are rather 
ontologically related to one another. This affects the ways in which we understand relations 
with those whom we identify as others. As a result a dialogically constituted critical self must 
be envisioned. Although always situated and positioned, this critical self is nonetheless 
capable of distanciating itself from other symbolic orders. This can lead to a heightened 
degree of reflexivity. This self is neither a fully conscious self understanding a transparent 
background nor a self run by forces beyond the conscious control of the individual (e.g., 
being, language or power structures) (Kinnvall & Lindén, in press). One important 
consequence of this approach is evident. This perspective calls for the preservation of the 
other within the interpretation. This can be helpful for individuals but also for institutions in 
avoiding the danger of ethnocentrism and of being locked in either the epistemic 
overpowering of the other, or in historicism, individualization and concealment of power 
structures and practices.  
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COMMENTARY TO PART III: 
COORDINATING POSITIONS TO ARRIVE AT CHANGE: 
CREATIVE TENSIONS WITHIN  
THE DIALOGICAL SELF FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Jaan Valsiner 
 
 
The chapters in this section do not form a coherent whole – which is precisely what is 
needed for a dialogically open discourse about the dialogical self. They thus reflect the status 
of the dialogical self research field – a sufficiently open field with variety of ideas and no 
theoretical monologisation anywhere in sight. This is crucial for keeping the research 
direction open for innovation – especially as interdisciplinary cooperation is the name of the 
game. The critical orientations visible among the four contributions, is a fitting testimony to 
the rapid development of ideas. While Kinnvall and Scuzzarello (2011) criticise Hermans’ 
original version of the Dialogical Self Theory (DST) for overlooking the implications of the 
social power that creates the ambience for the self (mostly relying upon as recent a text as 
Hermans & Dimaggio, 2007), Hermans himself has developed his theoretical ideas in a new 
direction (Gieser & Hermans, 2011; Hermans & Hermans-Konopka, 2010) that leaves at least 
some of Kinnvall and Scuzzarello’s critique as a fish thrown out by dynamic waves of the 
ocean to the beach to become prey to seagulls. True – Gieser and Hermans take their 
advancement of the DST in this volume in a direction opposite to what Kinnvall and 
Scuzzarello would want to see developed. Yet it is not their role to fill in all the existing gaps 
in DST – it is precisely the role of the critiques to transcend the existing theoretical system 
and transform it into a more thorough version. In my view this transformation has not (yet) 
happened – the social power context of DST and its implications for the dynamic functioning 
of the dialogical self remains without sufficient theoretical elaboration. The problem is 
sighted – but its solution is not created. 
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FROM DECONSTRUCTION TO RECONSTRUCTION 
 
The latter problem – critique without constructive innovation – is of course a wider issue 
in the social sciences at large. The deconstructionist fashion – building on the easy 
opportunity to look smart in the post-modern era by fighting all kinds of dualism, or 
positivism, or any other ’–ism’ (behaviourism, cognitivism, etc.) – has left a profound mark 
on the thinking of new generations of social scientists who often even label their perspectives 
‘critical X’ (‘critical psychology’ is but one example). The discourses around DST are about 
to – but have not yet – overcome the confines of the deconstructionist ethos and move into the 
reconstruction path. This is partly due to the researcher’s closeness to the phenomena (self 
dialogues, inside the mind or between them), and to the connection with one particular area 
where these phenomena are especially accentuated. This area is the study of psychotherapy 
processes – as discussed by two of the four contributions in this section (Gieser & Hermans, 
2011; Gonçalves et al., 2011) Psychotherapy is a context of human activity that is particularly 
suited for DST as it entails the slowed-down (or temporarily arrested) flow of the operation of 
the dialogical self. The client – as well as the therapist – spend many sessions having intense 
dialogues in order to arrive at a single – and often reversible – innovative moment in the 
course of their thinking (and feeling – see Gonçalves et al., 2011). Hence the phenomena of 
new, emerging forms within the dialogical self are more discernible and accessible than in the 
flow of ordinary dialogues. Psychotherapy is a kind of a microscope for the purposes of DST. 
The ‘father of microbiology’ Antoni van Leeuwenhoek and the ‘father of DST’ Hubert 
Hermans thus have something in common – besides being Dutch – that is of relevance for 
biology and psychology – the means for how to look and the directions in which to look. 
 
 
RECONSTRUCTION NEEDS THEORETICAL CREATIVITY:  
TENSIONS AND TRANSITIONS 
 
However, sciences do not develop by data. They develop by ideas. Psychology at large 
has accumulated empirical evidence on almost every possible common-sense problem of the 
mind. Yet it fails to produce coherent knowledge that is elegant in its abstract form and 
applicable in the myriads of social contexts.  
The four chapters in this section of the book point to three themes – the need to view the 
dialogical self within its social power context (structured environment), recognition of the 
affective dynamics of the I-positions (dynamic change), and the coordination of the networks 
of I-positions and their structured contexts. While widening the scope of the study of the self 
by turning the concept from unitary self to multiple I-positions, the dialogical self perspective 
has reached a state in which these issues cannot be ignored. The contributions to this section 
offer fresh recipes for theoretical innovation: linking empathy with the DST as Gieser and 
Hermans do; looking at the moments of breakthrough in the self-negotiation processes, using 
the notion of re-conceptualisation as Gonçalves and his colleagues propose in their chapter; 
and pointing to the real social power structures that guide the dialogical selves of immigrants 
as Kinnvall and Scuzzarello show in their chapter. Raggatt’s focus on the dialogical self 
creating different arenas of embodiment for men and women allows the reader to see the 
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immediacy of the starting point of dialogical encounters. We can outline a number of tensions 
the reader might feel while encountering discourses in the social sciences. 
 
 
Tension in the Methods<>Theory Relations 
 
It is usual in the social sciences that there are discrepancies between the theories and 
methods used in empirical work. Or – theories may be fitted to the methods, rather than the 
other way around. On the side of empirical research techniques in DST we do not see the kind 
of heterogeneity that is evident in the theoretical ideas in the four chapters in this section. The 
use of statistical inference based on accumulating coded units still continues to be a part of 
the researchers’ empirical strategies. To borrow Kinnvall and Scuzzarello’s notion of 
securitising from the domain of social regulation of immigrants’ conduct, we could think of 
the demands of the social sciences as an institution for limiting the creativity of methods 
construction in the past decades (Toomela & Valsiner, 2010). This is a form of securitisation 
– ensuring that whatever the social scientists may talk about, their actual empirical data pass 
the phenomena under consideration by. The result has been a conceptual confusion 
(Wittgenstein, 1958, p. 232).  
A newly conceptually liberated field, such as the dialogical self perspective, needs a 
corresponding liberating focus in methods. Here we see different directions – Gieser and 
Hermans move in the direction of dynamic analysis of processes in their look at empathy, and 
Gonçalves and his colleagues demonstrate the unique events of Innovating Moments in their 
meticulous analysis of psychotherapy processes. At the same time, Raggatt investigates the 
dialogical self by way of a life narrative-based assessment method, designed to ‘map’ I-
positions within the individual (Personality Web Protocol). Theoretically Raggatt emphasises 
that I-positions – which are frequently described by individuals in terms of paired opposites – 
can be explained by both intra-personal (reflexive) and inter-personal (social) positioning. 
The relatedness of these positions is implicated – but not studied. The results that are reported 
do not show how the different I-positions are being coordinated – but merely end in a claim 
about a basic gender difference in what constitutes the “embodiment arena” for males (torso) 
and females (face). This evidence is undoubtedly useful – but not directly relevant for the 
development of DST.  
The very notion of assessment may guide researchers towards overlooking the 
coordinative dynamics of the relations between I-positions – thus securitizing the empirical 
domain of dialogical self research for the purposes of social desirability of the normal science 
of psychology. Such monological closure of methodology is a social constraint on the path of 
an innovative set of ideas becoming productive in arriving at new knowledge. To live up to 
the focus on coordination – as a process – the methods of the study of dialogical self need to 
go beyond repertoires of static representations of I-positions and – after locating such 
positions in space and time – make their mutual interweaving explicit. 
 
 
Tension between Monologising Institutions and Dialogical Selves 
 
Kinnvall and Scuzzarello criticise the DST for overlooking the moves by social 
institutions to guide human selves towards ‘monological closures’ – attempts made by a 
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single authority to monopolise meaning to the exclusion of all competing voices. It is true that 
from its outset the different versions of the DST have prioritised the self in amidst other 
selves. After all, the revolution in understanding the self that Hermans introduced – seeing the 
double system of unity of A and its opposite (counter-A) in the same whole – has been the 
main focus of enquiry. While the social context of the self has not been denied – it has also 
not been the target of specific attention. The important step in DST is to examine personal 
(dialogical) and social (monologizing) constructions of the self – so the tension in the 
self/other relation should lead the field to think of self and identity in terms of both change 
and continuity. This amounts to assuming the developmental perspective and moving the 
DST out of its original birthplace (personality theory) to the wide and tumultuous waters of 
developmental science (Cairns, Elder & Costello, 1996). Again the need to study the 
dynamics of positioning becomes evident: 
 
“…a dialogically constituted critical self must be envisioned. Although always situated and 
positioned, this critical self is nonetheless capable of distanciating itself from other symbolic 
orders. This can lead to a heightened degree of reflexivity. This self is neither a fully 
conscious self understanding a transparent background nor a self run by forces beyond the 
conscious control of the individual (e.g., being, language or power structures).” (Kinnvall & 
Scuzzarello, 2011, p. 341) 
 
This theoretical direction needs to lead to a developmental research programme where the 
coordination of uniform demands and multiform versions of dialogical self is being studied. 
The unifying loyalty demands (“you must be X”) are targets of dialogical resistance (I-
position of X <> I-position of non-X) that is further coordinated with the role of others (“my 
mother insists I should be X… I am X but I am happier as non-X”). It is here that the notion 
of empathy enters (Gieser & Hermans, 2011). Yet merely importing the notion of empathy – 
feeling into the other – to the dialogical self is no solution. The empathic process needs to be 
located within the transforming kaleidoscope of I-positions – which are guided by 
monologising social imperatives. The impact of the ‘ten commandments’ for one’s dialogical 
relating with oneself is not to be overlooked in the European Reformation/Counter-
Reformation era, just as the Kali/Durga myth may be the social guide for understanding 
gender relations in the Indian context.  
 
 
Tension between Myself-oriented-to-the-other and Myself-oriented-towards-
Myself 
 
All external dialogues are de facto trialogues – aside from the interlocutor out there, there 
exists a basic duality within the self right in the very act of speaking. As Gieser and Hermans 
emphasise,  
 
“Whenever we have a conversation, we hear our own voice and the voice of the other. 
Moreover, in a friendly conversation we also tend to adjust our use of words or phrases, 
pronunciation and intonation to our fellow conversant. This enables us to feel into the 
experience of another person's voice because of its similarity to our own voice. What further 
contributes to this empathy is that, in the course of a conversation, we experience a continual 
switching of attentional focus, between our voice either in the background or in focus and the 
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other's voice either in the background (e.g., when both of us speak simultaneously) or in 
focus. In either case, our voices become linked in one experiential Gestalt and hence we may 
feel into another person’s narratives as if they were our own.” (Gieser & Hermans, 2011, MS 
p. 293, original emphasis) 
 
The point of feeling as-if-the other is crucial here – without such feeling-in no relating 
between the interacting I-positions – be those interacting persons or interacting I-positions 
within the dialogical self – would be possible.  
The innovative moment here is the notion of experiential Gestalt – a term that needs 
further elaboration. Gestalt is of course a term well known for psychologists from their 
usually monologised education about the history of their discipline. It is a whole – but here 
the problems begin. Which kind of whole? A static one? A dynamic field? How do “voices 
become linked” in a whole? By simple merging, or by mutual resonating? These are questions 
that the new direction charted out by Gieser and Hermans needs to address.  
 
 
Tension between Distancing and Feeling-in: The Basis for Re-
Conceptualisation 
 
Of all the four in this section, the chapter by the Minho Group (Gonçalves et al.) 
addresses these issues of development most directly. The key is the notion of the transition 
from mutual in-feeding processes to re-conceptualisation (and further to irreversible change). 
As they remark, 
 
“…re-conceptualisation implies the contrast between past and present, and aggregates the old 
self with the transformed self, it achieves a new sense of unity in the dialogical self, 
surpassing the former dualities and ambivalence usually inherent to a mutual in-feeding 
process between opposing voices.” (Goncalves et al., 2011, MS p. 269) 
 
The focus on re-conceptualisation brings the process orientation of the DST to the need to 
conceptualise dialectical synthesis. Psychology has had an ambivalent history of relations 
with the notion of dialectics – striving towards it, yet dismissing it near the point of new 
solutions to old problems. It is here where the focus on feeling-in (Einfühlung) fits as a 
process mechanism. As Gieser and Hermans point out, the process of psychotherapy is 
 
“…a dynamic process of distancing and feeling into, of emotional reflection and emotional 
immersion. But we would also like to take it a step further and argue that empathy, broadly 
conceived, is more than a complex psychological phenomenon; it is the ontological basis of 
dialogue and dialogical relationships as such. Too often we tend to narrow down the notion of 
dialogue to an interplay of words.” (Gieser & Hermans, 2011, MS p. 296) 
 
Thus, distancing together with simultaneous feeling-in is the mechanism that leads to re-
conceptualisation and change. In order to arrive at change the person needs to empathise with 
oneself – at first moving part of the self to a distance from where the given I-position can feel 
in with the other one. As described by Gonçalves et al., 
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“…preliminary findings indicate that mutual in-feeding tend to persist during therapy when 
the therapist respond to it by understanding predominantly the innovative voice (by 
amplifying it), instead of understanding the problematic voice (trying to explore what it is in 
the client’s experience that prevents change).” (MS p. 268) 
 
Amplification of the innovative voice – ‘pushing’ the psychological system beyond its 
limits (and preventing the return to the previous equilibrium) – seems to be the pathway to 
qualitative breakthrough. If we consider the therapist to be one of the social monologisation 
agents – after all, the role of the therapist is that of a social power – we can consider 
amplification of monologisation by the therapist as a distancing device (for example, client: 
“I feel X and non-X” therapist: “but it seems X is really what you feel” client: “oh yes, I 
really feel X… thank you… and I suddenly feel confused as I now feel Y and non-Y”). By 
suggesting a monologised moment the therapist attempts – basically forces – the client to 
overcome the previous dialogical state. This move on the therapist’s behalf is possible 
through emulating – feeling into, but not becoming identical with – the client’s current 
dialogical state. The suggested monologised moment is distanced from the previous 
(hyper)dialogical state of the client – and thanks to that distance makes it possible to develop 
into a new dialogical state. In general – the dialogical self works through constant efforts 
towards monologisation that – when it succeeds – may lead to a qualitatively new state of the 
dialogical self. If this is so – it is not Mikhail Bakhtin’s but Georg Friedrich Wilhelm Hegel’s 
forgotten and retrospectively distorted theoretical legacy that the DST might need. Time will 
tell.  
 
 
CONCLUSION: THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING OPEN 
 
Theoretical innovations go through a set of phases where at first they open the thinking of 
researchers to new possibilities of enquiry, then constitute the arena for such enquiry in 
practice, and – finally – reach a plateau where no new exciting issues seem possible. DST 
opened the field of self/personality research in the 1990s to the possibility of enquiring the 
processes behind categorical statements about the self. The contributions to this book as a 
whole – and the four contributions that have been the focus of this commentary – show that 
the DST discourses are in the intermediate state of active but somewhat parallel lines of 
enquiry. Such multivoicedness – if maintained both in theoretical and empirical efforts – 
should save the field from reaching the final state of monologised ‘expertise’ status. 
Coordination – rather than assimilation – of perspectives remains the key to such intellectual 
longevity. 
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IN PLACE OF A CONCLUSION 
 
 
IN SEARCH OF AN ALTERNATIVE 
 
This book has placed dialogicality at the centre of understanding human mind and 
interaction. In their sometimes complimentary, sometimes divergent ways all the chapters in 
this volume have been concerned with the maintenance of a dialogical conceptualisation in 
unpacking the complexities of human sense-making, communication and inter-group 
relations. The contributions by Haye and Larrain, by Raggatt, and by Lonchuk and Rosa have 
all engaged with the question, how to best conceptualise and analyse our dialogical 
engagement with the world through which our knowledge – including the knowledge about 
ourselves – becomes constructed. Likewise, Joerchel’s contribution, in forcing us to start our 
investigations by looking at the resonance of two individuals (instead of one), deals with the 
question of how intersubjectivity and the possibility for communication emerges. Moving 
from the abstract to the concrete, the chapters by the Minho group and by Gieser and 
Hermans consider what this dialogical engagement means for the organisation and 
development of the individual self. Moving beyond the individual level, Kinnvall and 
Scuzzarello tackle the issue of dialogicality in the society, trying to explore how and why 
people sometimes do and sometimes do not want to dialogue with each other.  
Importantly though, this book has also placed dialogicality at the centre of understanding 
the phenomenon of ‘research’. Many of the authors in this book have touched upon the issue 
of maintaining and encouraging dialogue in the conduct and presentation of research, and 
reflected upon the pressures and constraints in the research world that close down possible 
dialogues and avenues for discussion. The authors have been concerned with how commonly 
employed methods may lose the phenomenon in movement and thus eclipse its dialogicality 
(inter alia Valsiner, Shotter, Akkerman & Niessen, Murakami). Others have talked about 
ways of resisting reification and monologisation in writing (e.g., Billig), about encouraging 
multivocality in analysis, in the presentation of research and in academic collaboration (e.g., 
Wagoner et al.), and raised concerns about the lack of dialogue between researchers and 
research participants (e.g., Hviid & Beckstead). In response, this book attempts to promote 
dialogue between authors through adopting the format of target articles and commentaries, 
thus focusing not on the monologues of individual authors, but on dialogues between several 
authors. In this way, it endeavours to foreground the responsive nature of acts of discourse, as 
highlighted by Haye and Larrain: the chapters represent active responses both to pre-existing 
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and anticipated acts of discourse by others. We can thus only hope that the book will be read 
as an invitation to continue the dialogue presented in these pages.  
It is obvious that some of these concerns about the conduct and presentation of research 
are related to the need to be ‘true’ to the underlying assumptions of the dialogical perspective. 
That is, to take ideas about orientation to the other, contextualism, interactionalism and the 
emphasis on semiotic mediation (Linell, 2009) seriously when doing research. They thus 
bring to mind the old dilemma of the turtle and Achilles, with Achilles as practice never 
really catching up with the theory-turtle. Yet the convergence of these diverse voices in 
raising the need to leave behind conventional ways of conceptualising, conducting and 
presenting academic research and welcoming a new, dialogical alternative seems to work also 
as an identity project for dialogists. It functions as an effort to create a ‘we’ in relation to 
‘they’ – the monologists – where ‘we’ is distinctly different, but also (and importantly) better 
than ‘they’. Yet is it better? 
 
 
DIALOGUE AND TRANSFORMATION 
 
In their contribution, Gieser and Hermans suggest that difference and distance are 
essential to dialogue. Likewise, Marková notes in her commentary: “The fundamental feature 
of dialogue is a clash of ideas, their tension and transformation through their confrontation” 
(MS p. 111). However, as authors in this volume emphasise, dialogue – or dialogical 
engagement with the other – does not necessarily lead to transformation, change or innovation 
of the self or ‘ideas’. Nor does it necessarily lead to a ‘resolution of discord’, as Marková 
asserts. Assuming this would be to impose a normative interpretation on the meaning of 
dialogue or dialogical, as Linell (2009) has highlighted (see also Akkerman and Niessen in 
this book). It is in this sense then, as Gillespie points out in his foreword, that a dialogical 
perspective allows us to understand human interaction as intersubjective, symbolic, cultural, 
but importantly also conflictual and potentially transformative.  
While the clash of divergent perspectives is fundamental, dialogue or encounters with the 
other that lead to some kind of transformation – a ‘transformative’ dialogue
1
 – also require 
the effort to overcome distance and difference. We may think of Gieser and Hermans’ 
discussion of ‘feeling into’ the other, or Bakhtin’s notion of ‘active empathising’ (1986/1993; 
as quoted by Marková, 2003, p. 103) for describing this kind of dialogical engagement. It is 
an ongoing struggle of relating to the other which is the starting point for transformation, 
rather than the retention of distance or ‘pure emphasising’ (ibid.) that eliminates or submerges 
the strangeness of the other. It leads to the creation of a new perspective, which moves 
beyond the ones out of which it has emerged.  
Yet how can we achieve such transformation in research? How can different voices, 
meanings or ideas come together in a new configuration that goes beyond their differences? 
How can dialogism become a ‘better’ science than monologism that makes sense and, dare 
we say, makes a difference, to others? This is an age old question that concerns us not only as 
a community of researchers, but as members of a heterogeneous society.  
                                                        
1
 In our discussion about ‘transformative dialogue’ we draw on Freire’s (2003/1973) notion of ‘critical dialogue’ 
and Jovchelovitch’s (2007) discussion about ‘dialogical encounters’. See also Aveling (2010) for further 
discussion. 
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By asking this question we refer, on the one hand, to the situation where both parties 
consider their own points of views too precious to let go of. This is the A versus B situation 
that Kinnvall and Scuzzarello tackle in their discussion about ‘securitization’ in the face of 
existential threat; a situation where tensions between perspectives are too substantial for 
dialogue to occur. In the research context, this might refer to the impossibility of having a 
transformative dialogue between dialogists and monologists, to use Billig’s language. Yet we 
also, on the other hand, refer to the situation that Gonçalves and his colleagues refer to as 
mutual in-feeding: a process of continuing dialogue between mutually re-affirming ideas A1, 
A2, A3 etc., which does not lead to any productive outcome or significant change. This latter 
situation seems to be characterised by abundance of dialogue, yet with equally fruitless 
results. These then are the friendly dialogues between like-minded dialogists, where the 
‘problem is sighted, but its solution is not created’, as Valsiner explains in his commentary 
(MS p. 349). The question thus remains – how do we surpass the unproductive mutual in-
feeding within the dialogical perspective?  
In our attempt to answer this question we return to Billig’s call in the opening chapter of 
this book. Billig reminds us that arguing, including academic debate, is contextual and 
relational. That is, in order to understand an argument and maintain its relevance, we need to 
know what it is argued against and need to continuously renew that relationship to the outside 
context. In Billig’s version then, dialogism needs to encourage transformative dialogue not 
only amongst the like-minded dialogical researchers, but also continuously re-negotiate its 
relation to the other ‘external’ perspectives in contemporary social sciences, such as 
mainstream cognitive psychology.  
Paying attention to the ground to better define and develop the figure – in this case 
dialogism – is obviously in accordance with the principles and assumptions of dialogical 
science. Having an idea how the ground is moving and evolving, in order to continuously re-
define and refine the figure is important for maintaining the relevance of the dialogue. 
However, leaving the dialogical aspirations aside, it is not immediately clear how a return to 
mutual in-feeding – that neither surpasses essential differences nor fuels innovation – is to be 
avoided. Because at the end of the day it is not about dialogical dreams, but about the ‘real 
stuff’ that matters in research, such as publications, grant funding, jobs, acknowledgment, 
recognition etc., which preferably should be given to ‘us’ and not to ‘them’.  
We agree with Billig that in order to break out of such mutual in-feeding within research 
a little help from others, who can function as catalysts of change, is needed. However, we 
would suggest that rival theoretical perspectives are not the only significant others who need 
to be (implicitly or explicitly) invited to take part in the dialogue. We would suggest that the 
invitation to participate should be extended also to those who are researched – that is, to the 
members of communities, organisations and groups of people that we do research with and, 
some would argue, do it for.  
 
 
CHANGING PRACTICES 
 
Who is social research meant for? Who should benefit from it? These questions about the 
purpose of social research are difficult and complex, with no easy and obvious answers. The 
impact of social research cannot be efficiently measured through the number of published 
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articles, conference presentations and other dissemination activities. As Gillespie points out in 
his foreward, an alternative measure of the ‘health’ of a field might be to ask the pragmatist 
question. Yet, as the current wealth of academic and political interest in ‘closing the gap’ 
between research and practice would indicate, translating research into policies and practices 
which make immediate and direct differences to people’s lives is difficult to achieve. The 
pragmatist’s ‘So what?’ question is thus an important, albeit difficult one to answer and 
engage with.  
In their chapter, Hviid and Beckstead call for “a solution based on the establishment of 
communities of researchers and research-participants, where the objectives and the direction 
of the research as well as the intervention in practice outside the empirical ‘zone of research’ 
is constituted and created as a shared agenda with importance to both parties” (MS p. 237). 
On a more abstract level, Shotter too calls for research that works from within, with the aim 
“of resolving specific confusions, disquiets, bewilderments, perplexities, etc., within 
[practices]” (MS p. 152). We find these calls to be important ones. If taken seriously and 
turned into research practice they have the potential to make dialogical research conceptually 
solid, academically competitive and socially relevant.  
Together with these and other authors (see for example Hedegaard & Chaiklin, 2005) we 
envisage a research practice where researchers move away from their tradition of thinking 
through their theoretical position, deciding about the research questions and choosing the 
methodologies before engaging with the research participants. Instead we suggest proposing 
researcher projects, which are not only open-ended, but where also the starting point is 
approximate and up for negotiation. Again building on Shotter’s ideas, we imagine research 
where researchers let go of their ordinary practice of knowing their way about, and instead are 
willing to take on a journey and find their way together with others, in an unfolding activity in 
which they are equally immersed as participants. For as Shotter argues in this book, only by 
allowing oneself to resonate with the others in the unfolding activity, only by listening to 
one’s own ambiguities, doubts and hesitations can one become aware of the ‘determining 
surroundings’ and thus be able to exhibit ‘the responsive understandings [the others] expect’ 
(MS p. 153).  
Yet there is more at stake than just our ability to understand things in the making, which 
can only happen if we work from within. Drawing on Levinas’s ideas, Marková in her 
commentary reminds us that our engagement with the world is above all engagement with 
others. Thus our being is fundamentally ethical, for by being part of the social world we have 
a responsibility to the other. She writes: “The self has no right to question what the other 
requires from him: his obligations and generosity to others is unlimited” (MS p. 112). 
Similarly, Ellis and Stam (2010), drawing this time on Ricoeur, argue: “an I is accountable 
for its actions in front of an other, as the other is counting on the I to perform them” (p. 429, 
original emphasis). The responsibility to the other is thus central to the dialogical 
conceptualisation of human interaction, and our responsibility as researchers in “aiming at the 
‘good life’, with and for others, in just institutions” (Ricoeur, 1990/1992, p. 172; as quoted by 
Ellis & Stam, 2010, p. 429) is central to our practices.  
It is through such a conceptualisation that the approach we envision is also essentially 
transformative. It is about difference between the viewpoints of researchers and participants; 
yet equally it is about emergence, about coming together in another way, for another reason. 
As Jovchelovitch (2007) has argued in the context of relations between intervention 
practitioners and the beneficiaries of intervention, what is required is an approach 
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characterised by the effort to take into account the perspective of the other and recognise it as 
legitimate. But beyond an ethical imperative, what reason could motivate the struggle to 
recognise the other – a struggle that has historically proven so difficult to overcome 
(Foucault, 1980)? The lack of a ‘reason’ or mutually relevant common goal may be the main 
difficulty of working within and between the different schools of thought. It is difficult to 
envisage a significant change, a move away from mutual in-feeding, without an external 
common goal. That is, it is not immediately obvious, how C can suddenly emerge from a 
friendly dialogue between A1, A2, A3 etc. Likewise, it is difficult to envisage finding a 
common goal that goes beyond the rivalry for scarce resources between different schools of 
thought, without it coming from somewhere else. That is, it is difficult to imagine how the 
fight between A and B can suddenly turn into a striving towards C, unless the common goal is 
introduced by those who do not necessarily care about the inter- and intra-disciplinary power 
struggles and simply want their lives to be improved.  
However, in envisioning this alternative we do not want to emphasise the importance of 
community engagement at the expense of theoretical innovation and conceptual development. 
On the contrary. Theory is the contribution of the researchers to the common activity of doing 
research. It is the tool that moves beyond the common-sense language, opening up solutions 
and ways of seeing the world that turns the everyday particular matters into generalized 
knowledge where what was previously tacit, becomes visible and intelligible. It is the 
researchers’ task to make it usable (Valsiner, 2009) for the common project, just as it is the 
research-participants’ task to ‘show’ the researchers where their concepts and methods fail 
and new tools need to be invented. In Freire’s (2003/1973) sense, researchers and participants 
should be co-agents. And as noted before, as humans living in the social world we have a 
responsibility to each other. Ideally then novelty emerges for the lived practices of the 
research participants and equally for the practices of researchers.  
Doing things differently is difficult. It takes time and energy and requires us to abandon 
our comfort zone for something unpredictable. Yet the ‘So what?’ questions do matter. And 
perhaps the unpredictable will not be that uncomfortable after all. Perhaps it will even turn 
out to be rewarding. 
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